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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London sparked 
nationwide outrage.  The American public was shocked to learn that the Fifth 
Amendment’s Taking Clause could be interpreted to allow the government to seize 
a non-blighted residence and convey it to another private party to help facilitate a 
development project.  Yet, contrary to popular belief, the Kelo decision did not 
mark a significant departure from the Court’s early eminent domain jurisprudence.  
This article traces the judicial history of the Public Use Clause and the police 
power of the states, and demonstrates the Court’s historical inability to clearly 
distinguish between these concepts.  This conceptual imprecision has led to a 
deeply flawed and unpredictable takings jurisprudence and the erosion of 
individual rights.  Moreover, the author demonstrates that returning the legal 
constructs of public use and the police power to their original narrow bounds 
cannot, in itself, restore a consistent and principled Fifth Amendment takings 
jurisprudence.  Rather, a multi-tiered takings test is proposed, which would allow 
for greater flexibility and precision in balancing the public interest against 
protections of constitutional rights than is possible under a jurisprudence focusing 
on notions of the police power and public use.
 
1 Associate attorney, Kutak Rock, LLP, Richmond, Virginia.  This article was the first runner-up prize winner in the 
Seventh Annual Program for Judicial Awareness Writing Competition, sponsored by Pacific Legal Foundation.  For 
more information, visit Pacific Legal Foundation's website at http://www.pacificlegal.org. 
2Introduction
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London2 has 
excited considerable debate, confusion and anxiety among American judges, scholars, politicians 
and property owners.  Following the Court’s holding that a municipality can use the eminent 
domain power to condemn non-blighted residential property for an urban renewal project, many 
Americans have reacted with varying degrees of shock, disillusionment and anger over what they 
perceive is an attack on their—heretofore sacrosanct—property rights.3 However, while the 
public is correct to view Kelo with deep apprehension, this case does not represent a significant 
departure from the Supreme Court’s early eminent domain jurisprudence.  Rather, Kelo
represents only the most recent and most publicized of a long series of decisions in which the 
Supreme Court has obscured the distinctions between governmental powers4 and restraints5 and, 
thus, eroded the Constitutional safeguards on private property.6
This article argues that the intellectual uncertainty surrounding eminent domain or 
“takings” jurisprudence has led to the erosion of 5th Amendment protections of private property. 
Specifically, this article examines the two concepts at the core of takings jurisprudence: 1) the 5th 
2 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).  
3 William Hoffman, Supreme Court Decision Sets More Property Fights, PACIFIC REPORTER, Jul. 
15, 2005 (stating that readers were concerned that “the ruling could make it costlier, financially 
and politically, to develop logistics facilities”); Lynne Jeter, Eminent domain ruling from 
SCOTUS stuns developers: many are leery of the private property rights implications,
MISSISSIPPI BUSINESS JOURNAL, Aug. 8, 2005, at S6-7 (stating that the “news [of Kelo] sent 
ripple effects throughout real estate and land development circles”). 
4 Specifically the amorphous “Police Power” 
5 Specifically the 5th Amendment’s restriction on Government appropriations of private land, or 
“takings”. 
6 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); 
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984); 
3Amendment’s Public Use Clause7 and 2) the “police power” of individual states. This article 
argues that the Supreme Court’s inability to articulate principled boundaries between these two 
concepts has deprived courts of the intellectual framework necessary for precise analysis of the 
conflicting principles and interests involved in takings jurisprudence, leaving courts and 
legislatures without a meaningful limiting principle for government takings. This results in 
haphazard and poorly justified court holdings, ad hoc judicial review and, ultimately, diminished 
property rights for private citizens. Sadly, the lack of an intellectual framework also has obscured 
possible solutions to the takings dilemma by denying critics an effective rubric for articulating 
alternatives to the Supreme Court’s approach. As a result, proponents of greater private property 
protections find themselves either without a coherent alternative paradigm for advancing their 
interests or advocating a paradigm that actually derogates from these rights.8
There already is a great wealth of legal scholarship critiquing the incoherence of 20th 
Century takings cases and suggesting different tests or theories for restoring order to this area of 
law.9 Some scholars have suggested that state-level legislation is the best method for striking a 
balance between private rights and public needs.10 Others advocate abandoning the Court’s 
current expansive interpretations of the police power and the Public Use Clause in favor of a 
more restrictive or conservative understanding. However, despite the volumes that have been 
 
7 Scholars sometimes refer to this as the “Takings Clause” or “Compensation Clause” depending 
on what facet they desire to emphasize.  
8 See discussion of the Strict “Public Use” argument infra. 
9 See generally, Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. Land Use & Envt'l. L. 1 (2003); 
Edward J. Sullivan & Nicholas Cropp, Making it Up—“Original Intent” and Federal Takings 
Jurisprudence, 35 Urb. Law. 203 (2003). 
10 See, e.g., Alan T. Ackerman, Condemnation Case of the Year: County of Wayne v. Hathcock,
45 ALI-ALR COURSE OF STUDY 269, 364-65 (2005) (discussing the embodiment of eminent 
domain in state legislation); Frank A. Vickory & Barry A. Diskin, Advances in Private Property 
Protection Rights, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 561, 605 (1997) (discussing state legislation that creates 
property rights that go beyond the Constitutional guarantees). 
4written on takings jurisprudence and near-universal agreement that this subject is convoluted,11 
there is almost no published literature directly addressing the question of why takings law 
became so muddled to begin with.  Is the current confusion attributable to sloppy application of 
precedent by 20th Century Supreme Court Justices, or is the problem more fundamental? 
Answering this question is an essential precondition to rebuilding the takings rubric into a tool 
capable of yielding consistent court holdings that are both logically defensible and capable of 
balancing private rights against public needs. As such, the “why” question is the focus of this 
article.   
This article asserts that the current incoherence of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence is 
not a recent development but dates back to the 1830s. It further argues that the internal logic of 
takings analysis had become unviable much earlier than most scholars have imagined and that 
the process of deterioration actually was complete by the end of the 19th Century.12 
This analytic deterioration can be traced to three specifically-identifiable causes that are 
largely overlooked by mainstream takings scholarship. These are 1) the fact that the concept of a 
state police power first emerged in disputes over the division of state and national power, i.e. 
federalism, 2) the temptation to expand the scope of the Public Use Clause to encompass 
government takings for public needs beyond simple use by the public and 3) the fact that the 
 
11 William P. Barr et al., The Gild That is Killing the Lily: How Confusion Over Regulatory 
Takings Doctrine is Undermining the Core Protections of the Takings Clause, 73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 429, 484 n.242 (quoting Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 
(1964)) (stating that “the predominant characteristic of [takings] law is a welter of confusing and 
apparently incompatible results”).  I do not suggest that all scholars reach the same conclusions 
about the direction that takings jurisprudence should take. My point is only that most scholars 
begin with the premise that this area of law is confusing. 
12 Many scholars begin their analysis with the 1887 case, Mugler v Kansas. This article argues 
that Mugler merely brought the latent imprecision of earlier takings cases to the fore. Thus, 
Mugler is better viewed as an analytic endpoint in understanding the tangled web of takings 
jurisprudence. 
5Public Use Clause and the police power evolved from two separate bodies of Supreme Court 
precedent, which did not  begin to converge until the 14th Amendment was passed in 1866 and 
the process of “Incorporation” began.13 
By analyzing the specific causes of takings jurisprudence deterioration outlined above, 
this article identifies three driving mechanisms for liberalizing takings law, all of which 
developed before the end of the 19th Century and all of which are present in the major eminent 
domain holdings of the 20th Century.  A comparison of these mechanisms and their causes to the 
alternative theories advanced by the advocates of increased private property protection 
demonstrates that the incoherence of takings jurisprudence is a fundamental problem inuring in 
the current takings discourse and that proponents of increasing private property protections must 
establish a new analytical framework for takings jurisprudence before they can effect meaningful 
change.  
Methodology
This analysis is divided into seven sections. Section 1 traces the Supreme Court’s 
increasingly expansive interpretation of the Public Use Clause from the early “Mill Act” through 
the 1850s when the Supreme Court began “incorporating” the various provision of the Bill of 
Rights against the states through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.  
 
13 Incorporation is the process by which the states adopted the Bill of Rights through the Due 
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. According to the conventional wisdom, the Takings 
Clause was not officially incorporated until1897 with the case of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). See ERWIN CHERMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 478-79 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the times 
when the various provisions of the Bill of Rights were incorporated against the states). However, 
the Supreme Court began using the language and logic of eminent domain analysis in state 
takings cases far earlier in the century. See Section 4 infra. This article emphasizes the 
underlying logic of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence in the 19th Century and does not view 
the Court’s disclaimer of its analysis as a bar to discussion.  
6Section 2 outlines the development of the “police power” beginning with Chief Justice 
John Marshall’s first articulation of the concept in 1827 through the Incorporation Era.  Section 2 
demonstrates how the Supreme Court increasingly broadened the application of the police power 
while retaining its narrow theoretical underpinnings in the common law of nuisance.   
Sections 3 and 4 analyze how forcibly conjoining the police power and Public Use Clause 
through Incorporation transformed the latent imprecision in each line of cases into points of 
tension in the new combined takings analysis. Section 5 then briefly addresses several prominent 
takings cases from the latter half of the 20th Century and demonstrates that the Court’s failure to 
address these points of tension when they first emerged in the mid-19th Century directly caused 
the three mechanisms of liberalization that muddle takings jurisprudence in the 21st Century.  
The final three sections argue that the dichotomous police power/public use analytic 
framework which underlies the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence cannot be applied in a consistent 
and principled manner even by restoring these terms to their original narrow ideations, as 
conservative judges and scholars advocate. Section 6 examines the arguments of two of the most 
prominent conservative critics of the Supreme Court’s expansive reading of the Public Use 
Clause, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas and Professor Richard Epstein14 and 
demonstrates how their proposed formulations of takings jurisprudence ineluctably succumb to 
the same theoretical and practical flaws as the approach embraced by the Kelo majority.  Section 
6 argues that these failings stem from the fact that Kelo’s critics challenge only the modern 
application of takings jurisprudence rather than its flawed theoretical predicates.   
 
14 Professor Epstein is the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, Faculty 
Director for Curriculum and the Director of the Law and Economics Program at the University 
of Chicago School of Law. See http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/epstein (containing further 
biographical information) (last accessed December 20, 2005). 
 
7This article concludes that the courts must abandon the flawed police power/Public Use 
dichotomy in favor of a more nuanced analytical framework and proposes a multi-tiered 
jurisprudential test based on the new framework, which allows for greater flexibility and 
precision than is possible under any reformulation of the current takings model.  
 
Section 1-“Round Holes:” The Early Evolution of the “Public Use” Clause
Though both the police power and the Public Use Clause inform takings jurisprudence, 
only the latter finds direct expression in the text of the Constitution.15 Specifically, the 5th 
Amendment states “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”16 The exact meaning of this pithy injunction is the subject of great scholarly 
debate, especially in the wake of the Kelo decision.17 However, the contours of what constitutes 
a “public use” have never been clear, even in the earliest days of the Constitution.18 
Commenting on the Supreme Court’s haphazard use of the term “public use” in Kelo,
Justice Sandra Day O’Conner stated that the Supreme Court’s application of the “public use” 
 
15 The term “Police Power,” is not mentioned once in the Constitution. However, if one takes the 
argument that the police power is coterminous with a state’s sovereignty to its logical 
conclusion, then it is possible to argue that the 10th Amendment, which states that “The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are 
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people” enshrines this principle. See U.S. CONST.
amend. IX.  
16 U.S. CONST. Amend. V (emphasis supplied). 
17 See, e.g., Norm Pattis, Not Public Use, But Necessity That Should Drive Land Takings,
CONNECTICUT LAW TRIBUNE, Jul. 25, 2005 (calling the Kelo decision “a grotesque perversion of 
the very rights and liberties we celebrate”); Robert Solomon, Court Took Proper Tack In Kelo 
Case, CONNECTICUT LAW TRIBUNE, July 25, 2005 (praising “[t]he virtue of Kelo”); Jerry Stouk, 
Unfinished edifice lex, NEW JERSEY LAW JOURNAL, Jul. 25, 2005 (calling Kelo a “high water 
mark” for eminent domain). 
18 See, e.g., Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896) (stating “The question what 
constitutes a public use has been before the courts of many of the states, and their decisions have 
not been harmonious”). 
8requirement “wash[ed] out the distinction between private and public uses of property—and 
thereby effectively…delete[s] the words “for public use” from the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.”19 Without this clause, O’Conner further stated that “[n]othing is to prevent the 
State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any 
farm with factory.”20 As a result, O’Conner concluded that “the specter of condemnation [now] 
hangs over all property.”21 
Justice O’Conner’s now famous statements aptly capture many Americans’ belief that the 
Supreme Court has destroyed the “public use” requirement.   However, while Kelo may have 
many negative effects on the application, or non-application, of the Public Use Clause, it is 
doubtful that this decision will further erode the logical integrity of the clause. This is because 
the Public Use Clause had become unviable long before the Kelo decision.  Writing in 1985, 
Professor Epstein commented that “[t]o judge from the cases and scholarship on the subject, this 
chapter [on public use] largely deals with an empty question.”22 Indeed, as early as 1949, a 
published comment in the Yale Law Journal concluded that “so far as the federal courts are 
concerned, neither state legislatures nor Congress need be concerned about the public use test or 
any of its ramifications.”23 Given this long-standing doubt among scholars as to whether the 
“public use” functions as a significant limitation on takings, it is necessary to ask whether this 
constitutional phrase ever has held meaning and, if so, what that meaning was. 
 
19 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O’Conner, J., dissenting).  
20 Id. 
21 Id.  
22 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN,
161 (Harv. Univ. Press 1985). 
23 Note, The Public Use Limitation in Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 
613-614 (1949). 
9Some of the earliest Supreme Court cases construing the Public Use Clause involve state 
statutes allowing a landowner to dam a waterway, and thereby flood upstream land in order to 
build a water-powered mill.  These “Mill Acts”24 required the owner to pay compensation to the 
owners of the flooded land, sometimes in excess of 150% of that land’s value.25 Further, the 
mills were available to all members of the public for processing their grain, albeit it at a fee.26 
Because these mills were so important to, and would be used by, the public at large, the Supreme 
Court in Burlington Township v. Beasley had little difficulty holding that the use was just as 
public as a highway or railroad: 
It would require great nicety of reasoning to give a definition of the expression ‘internal 
improvement’27 which…would show that the means of transportation were more valuable 
to the people of Kansas than the means of obtaining bread. It would be a poor consolation 
to the people of this town to give them the power of going in and out of the town upon a 
railroad, while they were refused the means of grinding their wheat.28 
That mills which the every citizen can use are “public uses” within the meaning of the 5th 
Amendment is too obvious to require further elaboration.  Indeed, Justice Thomas cites these in 
his Kelo dissent as the paragon of public uses, even while advocating for a narrow interpretation 
of the phrase.29 However, while the Beasley Court’s holding clearly was consistent with the 
Public Use Clause, the Court’s rationale for the holding was highly problematic. 
The Beasley Court actually advanced two rationales for upholding the constitutionality of 
this Mill Act.  The most obvious rationale was that mills were like roads because they were 
 
24 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2681. 
25 Epstein, supra note 15, at 174 (citing New Hampshire Mill Act) 
26 Township of Burlington v. Beasley, 94 US 310, 313 (1876). 
27 ‘Internal improvement’ was the language used by a Kansas statute to describe projects built on 
land condemned using eminent domain and which were required by law to be open to all 
members of the public, such as highways, railroads, canals and government buildings. Id. Thus, 
the term is merely a synonym for “public use” even under the term’s strictest construction. 
28 Id. at 313-314. 
29 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2681 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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publicly accessible. However, a brief examination of the above passage reveals that the court, 
perhaps unintentionally, also grounded its holding on the fact that the mills were necessary for 
the public to have a “means of grinding their wheat.”30 This public necessity argument is wholly 
irrelevant to the 5th Amendment question of whether the mills actually were used by the public. 
Having concluded that the condemnations were for a “public use,” the Beasley Court need not—
and should not—have continued its inquiry. Moreover, it is not even clear whether the public use 
rationale or the public necessity rationale was the driving force behind the holding. This 
unfortunate dictum marks the beginning of the Public Use Clause’s intellectual deterioration. 
Nine years after Beasley, the Supreme Court addressed another mill act in Head v. 
Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.31 The act under consideration in Head was a so-called “General 
Mill Act,” which authorized property owners to use the eminent domain power to build mills for 
private uses such as manufacture.  In holding this mill act constitutional, the Head Court blandly 
remarked that various lower courts had upheld these condemnations for private enterprise “by 
reason of the advantages inuring to the public from the improvement of water power and the 
promotion of manufactures”32 and that such judicial practice was “confirmed by long usage or 
prior decisions.”33 The court then proceeded to string cite prior state and lower federal court 
precedent without comment. 
The Head decision should have refocused the public use inquiry. Instead, the Head Court 
chose to raise the public use question explicitly, comment on its breadth, and then duck the 
question entirely: 
 
30 Beasley, 94 US at 314. 
31 113 U.S. 9 (1885). 
32 Id. at 19. 
33 Id. 
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The question whether the erection and maintenance of mills for manufacturing purposes 
under a general mill act…can be upheld as a taking, by delegation of the right of eminent 
domain, of private property for public use, in the constitutional sense, is so important and 
far reaching, that it does not become this court to express an opinion upon it, when not 
required for the determination of the rights of the parties before it. We prefer to rest the 
decision of this case upon the ground that such a statute, considered as regulating the 
manner in which the rights of proprietors of lands adjacent to a stream may be asserted 
and enjoyed, with a due regard to the interests of all, and to the public good, is within the 
constitutional power of the legislature.34 
Commentators such as Epstein have been quick to point out that the Head Court utterly 
fails to provide “an explanation of how the confrontation with the Public Use Clause can be 
avoided.”35 The Court clearly states the property was taken under the power of eminent domain 
and even discussed possible rationales for including these kinds of ‘public necessity’ takings 
within the ‘public use’ rubric.  In light of these statements, the court’s assertion that “the 
question…is so important and far reaching, that it does not become this court to express an 
opinion upon it” borders on the comic. However, as forceful as these criticisms are, they fail to 
capture the full extent of the violence that the Head Court did to public use jurisprudence. 
 The U.S. Supreme Court could have avoided a direct conflict with the Public Use Clause 
by categorizing the Mill Act Cases as a constitutional oddity justified by history, court precedent 
and little else. While such an approach would not have been wholly intellectually satisfying, it 
would have allowed the Court to reach the same result while confining the damage done to the 
Public Use Clause to one rarified subset of cases.  Scholars and courts trying to read coherence 
back into the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence have favored this approach.36 Indeed, when the 
Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with the same facts sixteen years before Head, the Court 
took this more honest approach, stating that: 
 
34 Id. at 20-21. 
35 Epstein, supra note 15, at 171. 
36 See, e.g., Kelo 125 S. Ct. at 2681(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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It is difficult to reconcile these statutes, upon principle, with the constitutional rights of 
the citizen. The property in such cases is not taken into possession and use by the public 
in its corporate capacity to be devoted to some purpose supposed to be for the general 
good; nor (unless the mills when established are to be deemed public mills…) do[es]  
the…public derive any direct use, profit, or convenience from them…37 
Once the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged this obvious constitutional reality, it went on 
to note that  
the incidental benefit to the public from turning to use all the power in running streams 
may be very great, and that, such is the nature of property in and along these streams, the 
power cannot be made fully available without such a law as that we are considering38 
Ultimately the court chose the socially useful—rather than the constitutionally 
defensible—result.  However, the court was careful to note that its result was informed more by 
the overwhelming weight of precedent than by any attempt at a coherent takings analysis.39 
Regardless of the merits of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding, it is at least clear 
what factors informed its decision. Future courts attempting to apply Miller’s reasoning would 
not be greatly confused by a judicial attempt to force the round peg of “public benefit” into the 
square hole of “public use.” The same cannot be said in Head. By stating that “public use” is so 
broad that it can encompass private uses with incidental public benefits and yet so narrow that it 
is not implicated by a government-sanctioned taking of land for private enterprise, the Head
court interprets the Public Use Clause out of existence.  Indeed, because the breadth of the 
exception is so much greater than the narrow rule, the Head court’s holding actually has the 
dramatic effect of transmogrifying the public use restraint into an affirmative grant of power for 
 
37 See, e.g., Miller v. Troost, 14 Minn 365, 366 (Minn. 1869). 
38 Id. (quoting Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532 (Conn. 1866)). 
39 Id. at 366-67 (stating, “Had not similar laws, in states having constitutional restraints similar to 
ours, been uniformly sustained by the courts, we should hesitate long before upholding this one. 
The decisions, however, are so numerous, and by courts of so great authority, that we are 
constrained to hold the law to be constitutional”). 
13 
government takings that incidentally benefit the public.  This result would not have occurred if 
the court either ignored the public use requirement or stretched it to encompass public benefits. 
However, by deviating from the Constitution in both ways, the Supreme Court was left with little 
choice but to concoct an inscrutable—and not surprisingly unnamed—governmental power 
possessing the precise dimensions of the void left by the public use restraint. 
 Based on the above cases, it is clear that by the mid-1880s the Supreme Court’s precedent 
had evolved in such a way that a judge could uphold almost any taking by employing one of 
three rationales: (1) the taking conferred an incidental benefit on the public and, therefore, was a 
public use; (2) the taking did not implicate the Public Use Clause but, rather, some mysterious 
legislative power that acted as an affirmative grant in precisely the same situations where a 
“public use” requirement would appear to impose a restriction; or (3) that takings jurisprudence 
had become so convoluted that it was incapable of yielding principled results. Thus, courts 
should simply dispense with the public use analysis altogether and defer to the legislature’s 
judgment as to whether the taking was valid or not. The three rationales will be termed engines 
of liberalization because they provide easy grounds for judges to expand the scope of the Public 
Use Clause in almost any conceivable situation. 
The damage to the Public Use Clause that many people assume was done in Kelo actually 
was complete after the Supreme Court decided Head in 1885. All of the confusion evident in 
cases such as Mugler, Mahon, Midkiff, Berman and Kelo can be traced to logical extensions of 
one or more of the three engines of liberalization mentioned supra. Sections 3 and 4 will 
demonstrate how the Supreme Court employed these engines in late-19th and 20th Century cases. 
However, it is first necessary to examine the other major conceptual actor in takings 
jurisprudence: the state police power. 
14 
 
Section 2-“Square Pegs:” The Evolution of the Police Power from Gibbons to Miln
For most of the 18th Century, the Public Use Clause only bound the Federal 
government.40 Because the federal government possessed only those powers specifically 
enumerated in the Constitution, any action had to be rationalized in terms of one of those powers. 
Though the Public Use Clause was a restraint on government power rather than a grant, 
interpreting this clause broadly allowed the federal government to condemn land for anything 
that could be deemed a “public use” even where such an action could not be justified as 
“necessary and proper” for the advancement of another of an enumerated power, such as the 
commerce power.   
In contrast to the Federal government, the states retained plenary legislative power except 
where they had explicitly delegated the power to the Federal government through the 
Constitution.  Prior to the incorporation of the Takings Clause, the only limitations on a state’s 
power to condemn land were its own constitution and laws.41 This is significant because, until 
the 14th Amendment was ratified, courts expounding on the various types of state power would 
not need to consider any overlap with a federal public use restraint in their analyses. As a result, 
the body of case law surrounding the police power developed in isolation from the public use 
line of cases.  
 Unlike the public use limitation, the police power is not mentioned anywhere in the text 
of the Constitution. Nor do any of the founding-era documents reference this power as such.  
 
40 See James W. Ely, The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of 
Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 333 (1999). 
41 It should be noted that many states either expressly provided for compensation is certain cases 
or provides this as a matter of state policy. However, this did not necessarily mean that the taken 
property had to be for a “public use.” 
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Rather, this power—at least insofar as it has a definitive legal meaning—is entirely of judicial 
creation.  
The first explicit reference to a “police power” comes from U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
John Marshall’s opinion in Brown v. State of Maryland.42 In Brown, the Court was faced with 
the question of whether a state lawfully could require foreign importers to obtain a license from 
the state or whether this power had been ceded to the federal government through the 
Constitution.  Because Brown was an early federalism case, the Supreme Court had an 
opportunity to discuss the various powers that states possessed vis-à-vis the federal government. 
The court noted that:  
The power to direct the removal of gunpowder is a branch of the police power, which 
unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the States…The removal or 
destruction of infectious or unsound articles is, undoubtedly, an exercise of that power, 
and forms an express exception to the prohibition we are considering. Indeed, the laws of 
the United States expressly sanction the health laws of a State.43 
In Gibbons v. Ogden, decided three years earlier, Justice Marshall stated that “the acknowledged 
power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic trade, and to govern its own citizens, may 
enable it to legislate on this subject (commerce) to a considerable extent.”44 
Courts and commentators have not been able to reach a stable consensus as to the scope 
of the police power. Some judges and commentators have held that this refers only to the states’ 
power to abate nuisances and protect against threats to the public health and safety.45 Under this 
narrow view, the term “police power” is closely linked with the state’s common law powers to 
 
42 25 U.S. 419, 431 (1827). 
43 Id. at 443-444. 
44 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 208 (1824).  
45 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 560 (1991) (stating “[t]he States' 
traditional police power is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and 
morals”); Christopher Wolfe, Moving Beyond Rhetoric, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1065, 1075 (stating that 
“traditional police powers... extend to the protection of public health, safety, welfare, and 
morals”). 
16 
abate nuisances.46 Others have interpreted the term to encompass the entire array of powers 
remaining with the several states after they ratified the constitution.47 Under this view, the 
“police power” is synonymous with the “residuary sovereignty” that James Madison described in 
Federalist 6248 and is “coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.”49 Yet a third 
perspective, introduced by the Supreme Court in the now-infamous Lochner opinion, attempts to 
find a middle ground between these two extremes by characterizing the police power as  
…certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of each State in the Union, somewhat 
vaguely termed police powers, the exact description and limitation of which have not 
been attempted by the courts. Those powers, broadly stated and without, at present, any 
attempt at a more specific limitation, relate to the safety, health, morals and general 
welfare of the public.50 
Each of these views finds some support in the early case law that developed the term.51 However, 
the overwhelming majority of modern scholars embrace the police power paradigm in which the 
police power is equivalent to the state’s residual sovereignty.52 
Notwithstanding legal scholars’ near-universal acceptance of the “police-power-equals-
all-state-power” paradigm, this position is unsatisfactory in several important respects. First, to 
the extent that police power is a mere synonym for state power, the term possesses almost no 
 
46 See, e.g., David A. Thomas, Finding More Pieces for the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting 
History Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. Colo. L. Rev. 497, 544 (asserting that “police power 
regulations are valid if related to preserving or protecting the public health, safety, morals, or 
welfare is rooted in the nuisance-suppression origins of police power”). 
47 See, e.g., id. at 510 (discussing the perception of “‘police power’ being commonly equated 
with powers of sovereignty, especially with respect to the states”); D. Benjamin Barros, The 
Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 471, 475 (2004). 
48 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 320 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 
2001) ("The equal vote allowed to each state, is at once a constitutional recognition of the 
portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual states, and an instrument for preserving that 
residuary sovereignty."); See also Barros, supra note 37, at 475.  
49 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240). 
50 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
51 See, Section 5 infra.
52 See Thomas, supra note 44, at 510. 
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analytical utility.  Thus, justifying a state’s actions as a “lawful exercise of the police power” 
merely substitutes conclusion for analysis and description. Read according to the majority view, 
this quote means only that ‘the state’s action is lawful because it is lawful.’ There is good reason 
to be suspicious of logic this circular or to believe that the Supreme Court coined a term for a 
non-starter.  A second reason to reject this rationale is that the fact that the text of the Brown v. 
Maryland53 and Gibbons v. Ogden54 opinions strongly suggest that Justice Marshall meant the 
term “police power” to connote something vastly more limited than the entire panoply of the 
states’ “residual sovereignty.”   
 Proponents of the “residual sovereignty” view of the early police power often point to the 
broader meaning that the word “police” held in the early 1800s as support for their position. One 
example of this is D. Benjamin Barros’ recent article, The Police Power and the Takings 
Clause.55 In this Article, Barros argues that 
At the time, “police” had several meanings relating to government. The term was used 
broadly to refer to civilization or civil organization, and “public police” meant the 
equivalent of public policy. From these usages, the term “police” evolved to mean the 
regulation and administration of the civil community’s laws and public order.56 
This article does not quarrel with Mr. Barros’ proposition that the word “police” may have 
included a wide range of meanings in the 1800s and that some of these were quite general. 
However, the fact that this term could have a broad meaning in some circumstances does not 
justify the assumption that Marshall intended this broad meaning to attach to the :police power.”  
This is especially true where the earliest opinions using the term contain strong textual evidence 
of a narrower meaning. 
 
53 Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419 (1827). 
54 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
55 Barros, supra note 37. 
56 Id. at 475. 
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Justice Marshall refers to the specific power that Maryland exercised in Brown as “the 
power of the state to tax,”57 the “general power of taxation”58 and “the taxing power”59 at various 
points in his opinion. At no point does Marshall state that this power is a subset of the police 
power.  Further, when speaking more broadly about state power as a whole, Marshall refers to 
this body of “residual sovereignty” simply as “state power”60 and “powers which remain in the 
States.”61 If Marshall intended the police power to encompass the totality of state sovereignty, it 
is strange that he used these much broader terms in every reference to the full universe of state 
power. In fact, Marshall did not use the term police power when talking about “state power” even 
once in the opinion.  
 The fact the Marshall court intended the police power to refer only to laws relating to 
public health and safety also is evident from Gibbons v. Ogden. There, Justice Marshall 
explicitly acknowledged that other legal scholars had referred to police powers in terms broader 
than his own: “this exclusive grant is a law regulating commerce; although, in some of the 
discussions elsewhere, it had been called a law of police.”62 Nonetheless, Marshall took great 
care to distinguish his police power from other types of governmental power: 
With regard to the quarantine laws, and other regulations of police, respecting the public 
health in the several States, they do not partake of the character of regulations of the 
commerce of the United States.63 
Thus, when Marshall refers to “[t]he acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police, its 
domestic trade, and to govern its own citizens…”,64 it is clear that he intends this sentence to be 
 
57 Brown v. State of Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 441 (1827). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 442. 
60 Id. at 435. 
61 Id. at 441. 
62 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 26 (emphasis in original). 
63 Id. at 178. 
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read as a list of separate--though overlapping--categories of state power and that no one of these 
listed powers encompasses both itself and the other two. Were this not the case, then this text 
would be ludicrously redundant. Barros’ conclusions regarding the general usage of “police” in 
the 18th Century may be valid as general propositions, however, they cannot be more probative 
of what the Supreme Court intended the police power to mean than the Court’s own statements.   
 After Ogden and Brown, the fact that the police power is only a subset of “state power” is 
at least reasonably clear from Marshall’s language. However, this clarity began to erode as early 
as ten years after the Brown decision.  In 1837, the Supreme Court returned to the issue of 
whether a state could pass laws that affected interstate and international commerce in City of 
New York v. Miln.65 In Miln, the court addressed a law passed by the City of New York that 
required the masters of ships coming into the Port of New York to provide the authorities with 
the names of all foreign passengers and which imposed large fines if foreign paupers were 
brought into the country. Miln challenged this law as an attempt by a state to regulate interstate 
commerce.66 The City claimed that it had the power to regulate paupers as a health and safety 
law that fell within the state’s police powers.67 Writing for the court, Justice Barbour noted that 
this case was governed by Justice Marshall’s earlier opinions in Ogden and Brown.68 Relying 
heavily on these cases, Barbour stated that it was in “the general power of the states to regulate 
their own internal police, and to take care that no detriment come to the commonwealth.”69 
Barbour further opined that it is  
 
64 Id. at 208. 
65 The Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837) 
66 See generally Id. 
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 142-143. 
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competent and as necessary for a state to provide precautionary measures against the 
moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts; as it is to guard against 
the physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infectious articles imported, 
or from a ship…70 
By characterizing this law as “precautionary measure” to protect the state from moral and 
physical hazards, Barbour brought the regulation in issue squarely within the ambit of the narrow 
health and safety conception of the police power articulated by Justice Marshall in Ogden and 
Brown. However, while the Miln court correctly captured the principle articulated in those 
earlier cases, it confused some of their reasoning.  
 After characterizing the New York law as an exercise of the police power, Justice 
Barbour went on to discuss the police power more generally. In this regard he stated: 
That a state has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and 
things, within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation; where that jurisdiction is not 
surrendered or restrained by the constitution of the United States. That, by virtue of this, 
it is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a state, to advance the safety, 
happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and 
every act of legislation, which it may deem to be conducive to these ends…That all those 
powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may, perhaps, more 
properly be called internal police, are not thus surrendered or restrained…71 
This statement is significant because Barbour equates the state’s power “to advance the safety, 
happiness and prosperity of [the] people” with an “internal police” power. This is a far broader 
statement of the police power than Justice Marshall advanced only ten years earlier. To the 
extent that all legislation is in some way related to “safety, happiness, prosperity…and general 
welfare,” Barbour’s statement of the police power swallows the whole of a state’s “residual 
sovereignty.” Significantly, the list of examples of this power that Barbour finds in prior court 
 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 139 (emphasis added). 
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opinions all fall within the narrower conception of the police power as preventing harm to the 
community from criminals and health hazards.72 
That the Miln court significantly expands the conception of the police power is evident 
from comparing Barbour’s statements with those made earlier by Justice Marshall. This, 
however, is not the full extent of the harm. By equating the police power with state sovereignty 
and then listing only examples of this power that relate to harm prevention it becomes unclear 
whether Miln has expanded the police power to embrace all state powers, or shrunk state powers 
to include only those of harm prevention. This would have had severe repercussions for the 
federalist balance of power if Barbour’s language had not been entirely dicta.73 However, 
Barbour’s equation of the police power with a state’s sovereignty provided the model that future 
Supreme Court opinions would cite to and rely on.   
 The fact that the Miln court misunderstood Justice Marshall’s statement of the police 
power’s function and limits should now be clear. This leaves the question of why the Miln court 
became so greatly confused by Marshall’s articulation of the police power only ten years after 
the term was coined.  Existent legal scholarship has not addressed this question, however, this 
article asserts that the Supreme Court’s confusion is attributable to the fact that the police power 
first emerged in federalism cases.  
 The precise issue in Ogden and Brown was whether the state law in question was a law 
rooted in the power to regulate interstate commerce—which the states had ceded to the Federal 
 
72 Id. at 140-141. One notable example that the court provides is that “a state has a right to 
punish any individual found within its jurisdiction, who shall have committed an offence within 
its jurisdiction, against its criminal laws.” Id. at 141.  However, no example of government 
power that does not involve restraining nuisance-like conduct or punishing criminals is given. 
73 Miln only decided the question of whether the law in question was a valid state regulation. 
Thus, the court’s further commentary on the scope of the police power was not needed to resolve 
the question before it. 
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government and could no longer exercise —or some other type of power that the remained with 
the state. To decide this constitutional issue,  Ogden and Brown, thus, needed only to state 
whether the law was one rooted in the commerce power or not. It was not necessary to the 
Court’s reasoning to decide precisely what power the state was exercising so long as it was some 
power other than commerce. By framing the state’s law as one primarily designed to promote 
internal public health and safety, Justice Marshall effectively demonstrated that the law was not 
primarily designed to a regulate interstate commerce.  Read correctly, Ogden and Brown only 
state that the police power is not the interstate commerce power. These cases do not suggest that 
all state laws must be exercises of the police power; indeed, Marshall explicitly mentions a 
separate taxation power remaining with the state.74 This distinction is subtle, but important. 
The mistake that Miln makes is to treat Justice Marshall’s merely illustrative example of 
a non-commerce-based state power as exhaustive. This is an easy mistake to make because in 
Ogden and Brown the law in question so greatly affected commerce that it could only be 
characterized as the product of a commerce or police power. However, the fact that only one of 
two characterizations was possible in these two cases in no way meant that these were the only 
two characterizations that could be used in all cases. Unfortunately, Miln missed this subtle 
distinction and, as a result, deprived the term “police power” of its former ability to describe 
anything more specific than state power. This error would have profound effects on later takings 
jurisprudence. 
 
Section 3- “Forcing the Round Peg Into The Square Hole:” The Convergence of the State 
Police Power and the Public Use Clause
A. The Conservative Model of Public Use & Police Power Interplay 
 
74 See, Brown, 25 U.S. at 441 
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At first blush, one would not think that the Public Use Clause and the police power ever 
would become entwined.  In its narrowest conception, the Public Use Clause is implicated only 
when the government takes land for public uses such as a road or courthouse. The police power, 
in contrast, has its roots in the common law right of the state to prevent individuals from harming 
other citizens or the public at large.75 The classic statement of this “anti-nuisance” conception76 
is embraced by the Latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, or “use your property so as 
not to injure another’s.”77 Thus, when the state proscribes certain uses of property that do injure 
others, it is not taking away a right that the property owner had to begin with. The state simply is 
exercising the right of self-defense on behalf of other citizens. For this reason, the state has never 
been required to compensate a land owner for value lost due to reasonable restrictions on land 
use.  
Because the wrongful conduct of a property owner is the touchstone of the common law 
of nuisance, this logic only extends to private actions that have been declared “noxious.”  Its 
theory cannot extend to preventing uses of property which cause harm, but which are not 
wrongful and has no sensible application to laws that force individual property owners to bear 
the costs of government improvements for the entire community.   
Once incorporated against the states, the “public use” clause falls on the opposite end of 
the state power spectrum from the law of nuisance. Under the narrow conception of Public Use 
 
75 See Thomas, supra note 44, at 544. 
76 The Restatement 2d of Torts § 822 elaborates on the elements of nuisance: 
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a legal cause 
of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the 
invasion is either 
(a) intentional and unreasonable, or 
(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling  
liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or 
activities. 
77 See Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) 
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Clause, the state may exercise its power of eminent domain to take land for a “public use” only if 
it compensates the property owner.  The logical distinction between these two inquiries becomes 
most clear by asking whose current or proposed usage the court is examining. Under a strict 
“Public Use” analysis, the question of whether the government can exercise eminent domain is 
focused entirely on what the state plans to do with the property after acquiring it. An anti-
nuisance analysis, in contrast, focuses on what the private property owner did with the land prior 
to the government action. Properly understood, these inquiries not only are separate but utterly 
unrelated. This conservative model of the relationship between an “anti-nuisance police power” 
and the Public Use Clause is best illustrated graphically. 
Figure 1. Conservative Model of the Police Power and Public Use Clause 
 
In theory, “public uses” are only a narrow category of public benefit because there are 
many ways in which the public at large can benefit from a property—e.g. providing tax revenue 
to fund municipal services, providing aesthetic beauty, etc.  Public nuisances, in 
contradistinction, are only a small subset of private land uses that may harm neighbors or the 
public at large or wrongfully withhold benefits. Many perfectly lawful purposes that courts 
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would not be prepared to categorize as nuisances can cause annoyance or harm to the community 
in the wrong circumstances.  Between these two extreme sets of state actions, there is a vast 
logical gulf that encompassing all other state legislation designed to create a public benefit or 
prevent a public harm. Thus, under this rigid theoretical model, a police power analysis and a 
public use analysis would never parallel one another, much less be confused.   
 
B. The Interplay of Public Use and Police Power Concepts after Miln & Head 
The theoretical model of state power described above is in accord with the most 
conservative conceptions of the police power and the Public Use Clause. However, the Supreme 
Court never has embraced such narrow definitions in its jurisprudence. When Justice Marshall 
first coined the term “police power” in Brown, he grouped quarantine laws, restrictions on 
imports, siting requirements for storage of dangerous materials like gunpowder, criminal laws 
and other laws relating to public “health and safety” under the umbrella of the police power.  
Criminal laws and regulations on siting and storage of explosive materials are easy to reconcile 
with an anti-nuisance rationale.78 However, it strains the logic of nuisance too far to state that it 
encompasses every possible regulation designed to ameliorate hazards to public “health and 
safety.” Thus, the police power, as originally conceived by Justice Marshall, can most logically 
be characterized as beginning with nuisances and covering all legislation aimed at harm 
prevention. Graphically represented, this brings the scope of the police power to the dotted 
middle line separating the prevention of public harm from conference of a public benefit. It does 
not encompass those laws that seek to improve public welfare through affirmative state action.  
 
78 Notably, Epstein by requiring an actual “physical invasion,” apparently would not consider 
this to be an act of nuisance abatement. 
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Both judges and scholars have remarked that the line separating harm prevention from 
benefit conference is often difficult to locate, because elements of both may be present in any 
given case.79 Even Epstein acknowledges that “some uncertainty must be tolerated at the 
fringes.” Nonetheless, acknowledging some “uncertainty at the edges” does not justify 
destroying the distinction altogether. To state that an initiative to give educational scholarships to 
all of its citizens is a law relating to “health and safety” is to stretch the term so far as to divorce 
it from any meaning. The same could be said of an attempt to characterize an average middle 
class home that complies with all fire, zoning and health codes as a nuisance because it 
wrongfully deprives the state of the tax revenue that it would receive if a shopping mall was built 
on that property.  
By conflating the police power with the whole of state sovereignty, Miln extended the 
scope of the police power up to the limits of state sovereignty.80 At the very least, the post-Miln
police power abuts the public use restriction. However, if the public use restriction is 
simultaneously misread as an affirmative grant of government power, then “public use” becomes 
just another subcategory of the police power. Displayed visually, Miln extended the scope of the 
police power all the way to the right end of the state power spectrum shown above. 
Had the Supreme Court done no more than conflate the police power with the state’s 
sovereignty, then the Public Use Clause and the police power always would collide. However, by 
extending the Public Use Clause to embrace all “public benefits,” the Supreme Court extended 
 
79 See, e.g., Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services v. Polk, 568 So.2d 35, 48 (Fla. 
1990) (“‘harm prevention’ and ‘benefit conferment’ are simply two different ways of describing 
the identical act”); Cotton Harness, Lucas and the Rebirth of Lochner, 2 S.C. ENVT’L. L.J. 57, 66 
(discussing “the debate of whether the law is aimed at ‘harm prevention’ or ‘benefit conference,’ 
a distinction most often in the eyes of the beholder”). 
80 See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
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public use leftward on the state power spectrum at least as far as the benefit creation/harm 
prevention dividing line.  This is displayed graphically in figure 2 
 Figure 2: State Power after Miln and Head
Figure 2 demonstrates that the collision of the police power and the takings clause is 
indeed messy. By interpreting “public use” as “public benefit” and by interpreting “police 
power” as “state sovereignty,” the police power and the public use restraint overlap whenever a 
state government uses private property to create a public benefit. As a result, any exercise of 
state power that falls to the right of the harm/benefit lines can be categorized either as an 
exercise of the police power or of eminent domain with equal accuracy. The confusion that this 
generates is obvious even to the casual observer. While the police power, through its common 
law ancestry, implies that the state need not pay for what it takes, the Public Use Clause 
specifically mandates compensation. However, the Head/Miln conception of state power 
simultaneously precludes and requires compensation in many of the same cases. The confusion 
that this framework creates should be distressingly evident. What is more perplexing, however, is 
why this confusion was not foreseeable. The Supreme Court was broadening its conception of 
the police power in Miln at almost the same time that it was expanding the scope of the Public 
State Power Continuum 
Preventing 
Recognized 
Nuisances 
Taking for Public 
Uses (ex  
courthouse & roads) 
Preventing a Public Harm Creating a Public Benefit 
Exclusive Police Power 
Public Use & Police Power Overlap 
28 
Use Clause in Beasley. This begs the question of why the Court did not foresee that its two lines 
of jurisprudence were on course for a messy collision.  Why did the court decide Head without 
accounting for the inevitable overlap that the new “public benefit” would have with its “police-
power-as-all-state-power” line of jurisprudence? These questions have not been answered in any 
published literature on takings jurisprudence. More alarmingly, these questions have not even 
been asked.  The oversight by legal scholars is unexplainable. However, the oversight by the 
Court can be understood by reference to history. 
 Prior to 1866, the Bill of Rights, including the Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment, 
only applied to actions by the Federal government.81 In that year, the states ratified the 14th 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which provides that: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law…82 
This Amendment began the process of “Incorporation” which, in time, applied most of the 
substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights to the state governments through “Due Process.” 
Before the passage of this amendment, the Takings Clause only applied to the federal 
government. To the extent that states had not delegated their powers to Congress in the 
Constitution, they retained plenary legislative power and were not bound by the Takings Clause.  
As a corollary, the Federal government possessed only those powers delegated to it by the states 
and did not have ‘residual sovereignty’ out of which a police power could be carved. Thus, when 
 
81 Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation,
90 IOWA L. REV.377, 395 (citing RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 2 TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 15.2 (2d ed. 1999)) (“As generally 
recognized, the primary purpose of the 14th Amendment was to provide freed slaves and other 
African-Americans greater federal protection from arbitrary exercises of state power”). 
82 U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
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Justice Marshall first articulated the boundaries of the state police power in 1827, he could not 
have foreseen its eventual merger with the federal public use restraint. Indeed, even as Justice 
Barbour misapprehended Marshall’s limited state police power, both the Civil War and the 14th 
Amendment remained on the distant horizon.  Thus, no matter how broadly he crafted the police 
power, Barbour could not have predicted its encroachment on the Court’s public use 
jurisprudence. Viewed in this light, the imprecision of the Supreme Court’s early public use and 
police power jurisprudence is far more understandable, even if no less unfortunate.  
Section 4- “When the Pieces Don’t Fit, Pretend they Do:” The incoherence of Post-
Incorporation Takings Jurisprudence
Once the Takings Clause was incorporated against the states, any exercise of that 
mysterious legislative power by a state would have to fall under the umbrella of the police power 
along with everything else.  Thus, by the 1880s, the police power had become one of the primary 
engines of liberalization.   
 The increasing prominence of the police power as an engine of liberalization in takings 
jurisprudence is problematic because the Supreme Court still associated the police power with its 
anti nuisance origins even as it was expanding its conceptions of that power. Thus, any taking 
that was justified as an exercise of the police power implicitly invoked anti-nuisance rationales 
which did not require landowner compensation.  The Public Use Clause, in contrast, required 
that the taking be both for a “public use” and that it be compensated as necessary preconditions 
for an exercise of eminent domain.  Merging the police power into an eminent domain analysis 
made contradiction inevitable. This, in turn, added further confusion to takings analyses and 
increased the possibility that a judge would rely on the punting engine to escape from the takings 
maze.  
30 
 Despite the obvious problems with this takings model, sections 1 and 2 demonstrate that 
this is exactly the rubric that the Supreme Court’s earlier jurisprudence compelled them to adopt 
when attempting to reconcile the police power and the takings clause lines of jurisprudence post-
incorporation.  This model, and the Supreme Court’s discomfort with it, is evident in the early-
Prohibition era case of Mugler v. Kansas.83 
In Mugler, the state of Kansas outlawed the manufacture of alcohol and statutorily 
declared all building and items used for manufacture to be ‘nuisances” subject to confiscation or 
destruction by the police.84 Mugler owned a brewery, which he operated lawfully prior to the 
prohibition law.85 After the act was passed, Mugler continued to operate his brewery until the 
police destroyed the building and all of the bottles, beakers and other materials inside of it.86 
Mugler and the state advanced two very different conceptions of the police power before 
the court. Citing a long chain of court holdings, Mugler stated that “a legislative enactment 
cannot make that a nuisance which is not such in fact”87 and that  
[s]uch a legislative determination would also be void, because, where the fact of injury to 
public health or morals did not exist, as here, it would be a violation of the absolute right 
of the citizen to follow such pursuit as he sees fit, provided it be not in fact 'injurious to 
the community’.88 
83 123 U.S 623 (1887). 
84 Id. at 656 (“The thirteenth section declares, among other things, all places where intoxicating 
liquors are manufactured, sold, bartered, or given away, or are kept for sale, barter, or use, in 
violation of the act, to be common nuisances; and provides that upon the judgment of any court 
having jurisdiction finding such place to be a nuisance, the proper officer shall be directed to 
shut up and abate the same.”). 
85 Id. at 656-57. 
86 Id. at 657 
87 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 290 (U.S.1887) (emphasis in original). The arguments of counsel 
are only carried in the old Supreme Court Reporter. Thus, the page numbers for the parallel 
citation only will be provided. 
88 Id. at 292. 
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Based on this reasoning, Mugler argued that his brewery was not a nuisance and that its 
destruction deprived him of property as much as if the state had taken it for public use.89 
Mugler further argued that, even if brewing could be deemed a nuisance, this only would give 
the state the power to enjoin the activity, not to destroy the property.90 This argument was 
consistent with the traditional nuisance law principle that “where a nuisance is to be abated, the 
abatement must be limited by its necessities, and no wanton injury must be committed.”91 
Further, Mugler advanced the novel argument that the state should be obligated to compensate 
him for the loss of value even if he still retained possession of and title to the land.92 In support, 
he cited Supreme Court precedent stating that actual use by the public is not required for a 
taking.93 
The arguments of the attorney for the State of Kansas are captured in the opinion of the 
Kansas Supreme Court.94 In holding against Mugler, the Kansas Supreme Court articulated a 
wide interpretation of the police power consonant with that adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Miln.95 After articulating this sweeping “public good” police power, the Kansas court noted 
that, prior to the ratification of the 14th Amendment, the states always had the power to regulate 
the use of private property and that all property rights were held subject to the police power of 
 
89 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273,  291 
90 Id. at 292. 
91 Id. (citing Babcock v. City of Buffalo, 56 N.Y. 268 (N.Y. 1874); Bridge Co. v. Paige, 83 N.Y. 
188-190 (N.Y. 1880); WOOD, NUIS. §738.) 
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 This opinion is reprinted in the old Supreme Court reporter immediately preceding Mugler’s 
arguments. 
95 “a government may regulate the conduct of its citizens towards each other, and, when 
necessary for the public good, the manner in which each shall use his private property. Id. at 280 
(Opinion of Justice Martin of the Kansas Supreme Court) (emphasis added). 
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the state.96 The Kansas court then concluded that the 14th Amendment’s incorporation of the 
Public Use Clause had not diminished this power through a rather compelling argument. First, 
the Kansas court stated that the purpose of the 14th Amendment was to grant equality to the 
former slaves and that the Amendment should be construed according to this goal.97 The Kansas 
court then noted that the protection of brewery owners had little relevance to this purpose.98 
Further, this court stated that “[n]either the real estate nor the personal property is ‘taken’ by the 
state for public use. The state obtains no title, no easement, no license,—nothing. And the owner 
is in no way deprived of his property.”99 
Perhaps most convincingly, the Kansas court noted the practical consequences of 
requiring state to pay landowners for any diminution in value to their property based on valid 
exercises of the police power: 
We will suppose the case of a new state where, either because no apparent necessity 
existed, or from inadvertence or neglect, no statute was enacted against the keeping of 
gambling houses…Must the state, as a condition precedent to the enforcement of 
legislation against the evil be compelled to buy the houses, or their furniture and 
gambling devices, together with the good-will of their business?... Think of the states 
being compelled to buy up gambling houses, brothels, and lotteries…before any statute 
for their suppression could be enforced!100 
Based on the seemingly intolerable financial burden that compensation imposed on states, the 
Kansas court concluded that if the framers of the 14th Amendment had intended “a construction 
so degrading to the states, and so subversive to their authority, it is doubtful if it would have been 
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ratified by a single member of the Union.”101 Thus, the Kansas court concluded that no 
compensation was due to Mugler for his loss. 
 The arguments of Mugler and the Kansas Supreme Court have been elaborated at such 
length for two reasons. First, each argument contains substantial logic and equity.  It seems 
unfair for a business owner to invest heavily in a factory or brewery and then have it destroyed a 
few years later because the state legislature has outlawed his trade. In contrast, requiring the state 
to compensate everyone who it wants to regulate would prove so burdensome as to be 
unworkable. Second, despite the conflict between Mugler and the State of Kansas, each side 
perfectly captures one of the strands of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence. Mugler’s statement 
that a taking can occur even when the land is not directly ‘used’ by the public is well supported 
both by Beasley and Head. However, Kansas’ claim that the state police power encompasses all 
legislation that furthers the “public good” is equally well supported by Miln.
Many scholars critical of contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence begin their 
inquiries with Mugler, implying that, before this case, there was a golden age of takings 
coherence.102 Indeed, Justice Thomas, in his Kelo dissent, specifically references Head and 
earlier Mill Act cases as examples of the correct approach to takings. However, the fact that 
neither Mugler nor Kansas is able to advance a broad definition of one concept without 
embracing a narrow conception of the other forcefully demonstrates that the incoherence of 
takings jurisprudence dates back far earlier than the Mugler opinion. The incorporation of the 
Public Use Clause against the states only brought the latent imprecision of Supreme Court police 
power and public use jurisprudence to the fore. The fact that this conflict was both very real and 
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quite unexpected in the 19th century is apparent from an offhand but telling remark made by the 
Kansas Supreme Court when hearing Mugler.
It is not a little remarkable that, while [the Public Use Clause] has been in the constitution 
of the United States as a restraint upon the authority of the federal government for nearly 
a century, and while during all that time the manner in which the powers of that 
government have been exercised has been watched with jealousy, and subjected to the 
most rigid criticism in all its branches, this special limitation upon its power has rarely 
been invoked in the judicial forum… But while it has been a part of the constitution as a 
restraint upon the powers of the states only a few years, the dockets of this court are 
crowded [with takings cases]…103 
This statement illustrates the fact that the Public Use Clause and the police power interacted in 
post-incorporation takings jurisprudence to create more confusion than either concept had 
created when applied on its own. This strongly suggests two conclusions. First, and perhaps most 
obviously, the Supreme Court did not consider the impact of its Public Use jurisprudence when 
designing the police power or the police power when interpreting the Public Use Clause. Second, 
the passage of the 14th Amendment was a potent catalyst for generating confusion in later takings 
cases.  
 In Mugler, the Supreme Court could not ignore the glaring contradictions in its two lines 
of takings jurisprudence or the fact that each party had significant support from precedent. 
However, while the Court could not escape the need to redefine the borders of the Public Use 
Clause and the police power, it could have used this opportunity to acknowledge the unintended 
effects of incorporation on the logical coherence of takings jurisprudence and abandon the old 
Public Use and/or police power mode of analysis in favor of something more workable.  Because 
no court could be expected to predict the Civil War and the ensuing changes in the federal 
balance decades in advance, the prestige of the Supreme Court would not have been diminished 
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by admitting that the old rubric was unworkable and by making fundamental changes. 
Regrettably, the Court chose not to address the fundamental imprecision of its takings analysis 
and, instead, simply shifted the positioning of the public use limitation and the police power on 
the state power continuum. In so doing, the Court made several new errors that would further 
confound takings jurisprudence. 
 The Mugler Court resolved the conflicting theories of the litigants by increasing the 
scope of the police power while reducing that of the Public Use Clause. In so doing, the court 
employed some highly suspect logic. First the Court noted that  
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result if, were it held that if the government 
refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the use of the public, it can 
destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any 
extent…without making compensation because, in the narrowest sense of the word, it is  
not taken for the public use. Such a construction would pervert the constitutional 
restriction…104 
However, less than a paragraph after announcing this logical and seemingly equitable rule, the 
Court stunningly announced that “these principles” have no application to the case under 
consideration”105 because the state’s action was “exerted for the protection of the health, morals, 
and safety of the people.”106 The Court then went on to state “all property is held subject to the 
state’s police power”107 and that this power encompasses the state’s ability to   
prescribe regulations to promote the peace, morals, education, and good order of the 
people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of a state, develop its resources, 
and add to its wealth and prosperity.108 
According to the Mugler opinion, an act grounded in this broad police power “by the destruction 
of property which is itself a nuisance…is very different from taking property for public use.”109 
104 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668. 
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Finally, the Court noted that a state can declare specific property uses to be nuisances through 
“valid legislation.” 
 The Supreme Court’s ultimate holding that leveling the Mugler brewery and destroying 
all of the objects in it was not an excessive abatement of the nuisance110 is not as disturbing as 
the logic that the Court used to achieve this result. First, by stating that “all property is held 
subject to the state’s police power” and then interpreting such power to include every possible 
act of state legislation, the Supreme Court effectively subjects all private property rights to the 
caprices of state legislatures. The only safeguard remaining on a person’s property is the flimsy 
requirement that the law depriving them of such property be “valid.”  
 What is perhaps most alarming about Mugler is that the Court’s reaffirmation of the 
police-power-as-all-state-power paradigm is accompanied by an intellectual retreat in the 
justification for the police power.111 Mugler repeatedly reasserts the links between the police 
power and its anti-nuisance origins.  Through this device, the Court is able conclude that all 
property is subject to the police power.  This is an extremely significant statement, because it 
implies that property ownership is conditional and that any valid state legislation depriving an 
owner of his property extinguishes the owner’s rights in that property ipso facto. Rather than a 
public use inquiry, this logic is a gross extension of anti-nuisance principles that effectively 
precludes compensation even if the “police power” regulation takes property for such purposes 
as developing natural resources or adding to the state’s “wealth and prosperity.” 
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111 These areas of legislation logically extend to such specific state actions as the damming of 
rivers, building of mills or mines or other purposes more related to the public use limitation than 
any notion of public health and safety. Thus, after Mugler, the police power arguably swallows 
the Public Use Clause while mandating non-compensation in these instances. This achieves the 
perverse effect of creating public uses through nuisance law. 
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 Legal scholars interpreting Mugler are quick to point out that this case unfolded during 
the height of the prohibition movement and the Supreme Court’s holding that states can declare 
any long-legalized property uses to be nuisances probably would not be extended beyond 
prohibition cases.112 There undoubtedly is much truth in this position. However, this is not a 
ground to dismiss the Mugler holding as an isolated historical accident. Regardless of what 
moral and political views may have influenced the Court to find no taking in this case, the 
Supreme Court reached its desired result by employing one of the same engines of liberalization 
developed in earlier cases; namely holding that the taking does not implicate the Public Use 
Clause but, rather, the state police power. The fact that the Supreme Court is unlikely to ever 
again hold that a state may declare whole industries to be per se nuisances does not defeat the 
fact that the Court used the same principles to achieve the desired result as it had in many past 
cases.   
The only significant innovation in the Mugler opinion is the expansion of the narrow 
nuisance rationale to buttress all exercises of police power, even those to that fall all the way to 
the right on the state power spectrum. It is possible that this decision was based on a genuine 
belief that alcohol production truly was a nuisance. However, the Court’s forceful—yet 
unsupported—assertion that “the present case must be governed by principles that do not involve 
the power of eminent domain”113 also suggests a growing awareness by the Court that takings 
law had grown distant from its historical justifications. Thus, if the Court was not willing to 
reduce the scope of the police power and the public use limitation to reconnect these concepts 
 
112 See, e.g., Sidney J. Spaeth, Comment, The Twenty-first Amendment and State Control Over 
Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REV. 161, 169-70 (1991); 
Kevin Wendell Swain, Note, Liquor By the Book in Kansas: The Ghost of Temperance Past, 35
WASHBURN L.J. 322, 342 (1996). 
113 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668 (emphasis added). 
38 
with their original justifications then some new rationale would have to be superimposed onto 
the takings framework no matter how uneasy the fit.   
Though the temperance movement ended almost a century ago, the engines of 
liberalization developed in early case law to justify the holding of Mugler remain viable and 
common today. Indeed, these engines are present in most of the major 20th Century takings cases 
and the police power still retains its associations with anti-nuisance principles. 
 
Section 5-“If Not Sensible, then Practical:” Takings Jurisprudence in Later 20th Century 
Cases
A. Ordering the Chaos: Achieving Practical Results from an Incoherent Analysis 
The specific techniques that the Supreme Court developed in the 19th Century are (1) 
stating that the taking conferred an incidental benefit on the public and, therefore, was a public 
use, (2) stating that the taking did not implicate the Public Use Clause but, rather, some 
mysterious and extraordinarily flexible legislative power, or (3) arguing that takings 
jurisprudence had become so convoluted and incapable of yielding principled results that ad hoc 
review was justified.114 
Stated tersely, these three engines respectively can be labeled as ‘stretching,’ ‘shrinking,’ 
and ‘punting.’ Using the stretching engine, the Supreme Court can find the public use test to be 
satisfied by any public benefit. This allows takings, but still requires compensation. Using the 
shrinking engine, the Court can find that the Public Use Clause only requires compensation when 
property is taken for “public use” and that the government appropriation under consideration is 
not for a public use and, thus, does not trigger the requirement to compensate. Because the 
Public Use Clause is read out of existence, some other state power (the police power) must be 
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present in these situations. The third engine can be used in those few cases where the taking is 
not defensible using the first two engines. This third engine also can provide auxiliary support 
for the other two and is named ‘punting’ because it begins with an acknowledgement that takings 
jurisprudence is too convoluted to apply in a principled fashion. Based on this, the Court is 
justified in deferring to legislative judgments about what is a valid “public use.”  This third 
engine is, perhaps, the most powerful because the less comprehensible or more suspect the 
Court’s opinion, the stronger this rationale becomes. 
 The characterization of Supreme Court justifications for liberalizing takings 
jurisprudence as “stretching,” “shrinking” and “punting” confessedly possesses an element of 
cynicism. However, this does not imply that the Justices of the Supreme Court are acting with 
dishonorable intentions or are intentionally distorting the takings law for activist purposes. In 
fact, the reason these three justifications are labeled “engines” is because they tend to operate of 
their own force even when the Court attempts to apply takings precedent to new situations in 
good faith.  
By the end of the 18th Century, the police power and the Public Use Clause had become 
so entangled and contradictory that a court simply could not engage in a credible takings analysis 
without redefining the boundaries of one concept or the other in individual cases. Thus, Justices 
engaged in takings discourse simply could not avoid employing one engine or the other. 
Similarly, because both a broad view of the police power and a broad view of the Public Use 
Clause were well entrenched in Supreme Court precedent, the decision of where to set the 
boundaries of the concepts in any given case could only be arbitrary or based on the Justices’ 
personal views of how the case should be decided. For this reason, even the most assiduous 
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Justice would be tempted to dispense with the pretenses of engaging in a thorough takings 
analysis in favor of deferring to the judgments of an elected body.  
B. Stretching, Shrinking, and Punting in Modern Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Berman, 
Midkiff, & Kelo 
 
i. Berman 
Many critics of 20th Century takings jurisprudence believe that the Supreme Court 
substantially eviscerated the Public Use Requirement of the 5th Amendment in Berman v. 
Parker.115 Here, the Supreme Court upheld a plan by Congress to use the eminent domain power 
to acquire and revitalize large sections of a “blighted” or slum neighborhood in Washington DC, 
in which area Congress exercises the plenary powers of a state government.116 One resident who 
owned a parcel of land in this neighborhood protested the condemnation because his particular 
property was not blighted.117 This resident claimed that the government’s proposal violated the 
Public Use Clause because the condemned properties would be turned over to a private agency 
for private development and whereas clearing unsanitary slums is necessary for the public health, 
safety and welfare, developing a “better balanced, more attractive community” by condemning 
non-blighted land is not a public use.118 
The Berman Court found in favor of the Federal government largely through the punting 
engine. First, the Court found that “an attempt to define [the police power’s] reach or trace its 
outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts.”119 After invoking the futility of 
engaging in takings analysis, the Court stated that “when the legislature has spoken, the public 
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases, the legislature, not the 
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judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs.”120 The Court then noted that this rule applies 
even where the government power in question is eminent domain.121 
After articulating the principle of near-absolute deference to the legislature, the Berman
Court proceeded to make some of its most controversial statements. First, the Court noted that 
“Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of 
eminent domain is clear”122 and that Congress has substantial latitude to determine the amount of 
land and the procedures for effectuating this end.123 Second, and perhaps most infamously, the 
Court stated that “the rights of property owners are satisfied when they receive that just 
compensation which the 5th Amendment exacts as the price of the taking.”124 
Critics have noted that these statements read the public use requirement out of takings 
jurisprudence.125 This view is supported both by the Court’s statements and by its refusal to 
scrutinize the government’s means in any way.  Indeed, the “statement that once the object is 
within the authority of Congress…” strongly resembles a necessary and proper analysis. This is 
inappropriate for two related reasons.  First, the jurisprudential presumption that “no word [in the 
Constitution] was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added”126 militates against reading the 
“Public Use” clause as a mere duplication of the Necessary and Proper Clause,127 which already 
prohibits the federal government from doing anything that does not advance one of its 
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enumerated powers.128 For the “Public Use” Clause to have meaning separate from the 
Necessary and Proper Clause it, therefore, must impose an additional restriction on government 
power. This is buttressed by the fact that the phrase “nor shall…” in the Public Use Clause 
connotes a restriction on government power and not an additional grant.129 
Second, if the Public Use Clause is a restriction on government power, it cannot 
accomplish its essential function when the task of determining when the restraint applies is 
entrusted to the party to be restrained. This is asking the fox to guard the henhouse. 
 Scholars and judges have paid substantial attention to these shortcomings in the Berman
opinion.  However, few of them have asked the more fundamental question of whether these 
shortcomings actually altered the outcome of the analysis.  This article asserts that they do not 
for several reasons.  First, by employing the punting engine, Berman followed the overwhelming 
weight of precedent. While the Court’s statement that the 5th Amendment requires only 
compensation for property taken may be unsatisfying from a theoretical perspective, it cannot 
make any practical difference if the Court delegates the task of deciding what a public use is to 
Congress.  Because the “legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public 
needs,”130 adjudicating the question of public use, even if done diligently, only serves to generate 
dicta.  
The second basis for concluding that Berman reflected no meaningful departure from 
earlier takings jurisprudence is that even if the Berman Court had eschewed the punting engine, 
it still would be forced to apply either the stretching engine or shrinking engine. Under the 
Supreme Court’s broad police power and public use constructs, the Court would be required to 
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decide whether the taking would be characterized as valid either under the police power or the 
Public Use Clause. Thus, even if the Court decided to apply a public use analysis, the ultimate 
question of what shape this analysis must take would remain arbitrary. 
 The third consideration in evaluating the consequences of the Berman Court’s blunder is 
the most important but also the most overlooked.  Because the primary variable in post-
incorporation takings jurisprudence is the determination of where to draw the boundary between 
the police power and the Public Use Clause, the only two outcomes are that the taking would be 
deemed a valid exercise of the police power or a legitimate taking.131 Even assuming that it had 
been theoretically possible for the Court to choose one engine over the other in a non-arbitrary 
fashion—which it could not have done—this still would not have affected the outcome of the 
case. A broad reading of either the police power or the Public Use Clause would have allowed 
the government to appropriate the land. The only question would be whether the government 
must pay for this appropriation or not.132 Thus, regardless of whether Berman decided to employ 
a public use analysis and regardless of which variant of the analysis they employed had they 
chosen to do so, compensation invariably would be the only question ultimately in play under the 
5th Amendment.  
Based on these considerations, there is no reason to believe that Berman effected any 
meaningful substantive change in the practical application of takings jurisprudence even if one 
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were to accept the highly questionable proposition that that, by the time of Berman, it remained 
possible to mangle takings theory any further. The only innovation of the Berman Court is the 
discomfiting honesty with which it applied well-established precedent.   
ii. Midkiff  
The Supreme Court returned to the question of what government purposes justified an 
exercise of eminent domain under the Public Use Clause in the 1984 case, Hawaii Housing 
Authority v. Midkiff.133 In Midkiff, the Hawaii State Legislature determined that a significant 
percentage of all private land was owned by a small number of citizens and that the vast majority 
of Hawaiian citizens leased their land from this small group.134 The legislature further 
determined that this extreme concentration of land ownership dated back to feudal landholding 
system that was in place prior to Hawaii’s admission to the union  and that the continued 
existence of this pattern “was responsible for skewing the State's residential fee simple market, 
inflating land prices, and injuring the public.”135 
Because the private landowners feared the tax consequences of selling their land outright 
and because most tenants were too poor to purchase it, the legislature created a redistribution 
system that allowed tenant’s to request condemnation of their leased land and to purchase the fee 
simple at a price determined by the state government. 136 The legislature further allowed tenants 
to borrow up to 90% of the purchase price from the government.137 Shortly after this program 
was instituted, several large landowners brought suit, claiming that the legislature’s explicit 
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intent to transfer land from one group of private landowners to another was not a “public use” 
and that the state therefore lacked the power to use eminent domain.138 
The Supreme Court upheld the program as a valid public use after finding that 
“regulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State's police 
powers.”139 Writing for the majority, Justice O’Conner noted that Berman was the “starting 
point” for an eminent domain analysis.140 O’Conner then repeated the Berman Court’s statement 
that  
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the 
exercise of eminent domain is clear… [And that] the means of executing the project 
[also] are for Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose has 
been established."141 
This is the same punting engine employed in Berman and its consequences here are no different. 
Once two questions of whether the government’s stated goal is a public use and whether the 
eminent domain is the proper method of achieving this goal are ceded to the legislature, the 
Court has few remaining grounds for overturning the taking.  O’Conner acknowledges the almost 
completely outcome-determinative effect of the punting engine through her statement that 
There is, of course, a role for courts to play in reviewing a legislature's judgment of what 
constitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain power is equated with the police 
power. But…it is "an extremely narrow" one.142 
However, despite O’Conner’ extensive reliance on Berman, Midkiff evidences a somewhat 
different—though by no means novel—formulation of the public use analysis. In Berman, the 
Supreme Court noted that Congress’ actions were designed to rectify the unsafe and unsanitary 
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environment of a “blighted area.”143 Though the Berman Court did not go so far as to hold that a 
run-down neighborhood was a common law nuisance, it is clear that this problem falls within the 
ambit of Justice Marshall’s “public health and safety” formulation of the police power. This is 
significant because the Mugler-era takings cases tended to use the shrinking engine and 
references to the police power to uphold such actions,144 whereas situations falling much farther 
to the right on the state power continuum tended to require employment of the stretching engine 
and a greater number of references to public use.  
 The issue in Midkiff is far more difficult to categorize than those in Berman, Mugler,
Miln and Head. The Hawaii state legislature does not, and could not, state that the landowners 
are using their property in any way that harms the public. In fact, by leasing their land to others 
who could not afford to purchase it outright, they arguably are conferring a benefit on the public. 
However, this benefit is public only because so many people and properties are bound up in the 
leasing arrangement. Unlike a property owner who, by building a mill on his land that provides 
the benefit of needed agricultural processing for the community, the decision of one landowner 
to lease his or her property to one tenant has relatively limited effects. This not only obscures the 
line between preventing harm and conferring a benefit, but the line between public and private as 
well. A final level of confusion is revealed by observing that there is nothing about the way the 
physical property is used that is problematic. The public harm (or non-benefit) is solely a 
function of who holds title. 
The multiple levels of analytical ambivalence presented by Midkiff frustrated principled 
application of a dichotomous (public use or police power) takings analysis because the Hawaii 
legislature did not propose a public use for the condemned land nor did it stop any harmful uses. 
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In all likelihood, the leased land would be used in exactly the same way after condemnation as 
before. Thus, neither focusing on the conduct of the landowner nor the proposed use by the 
government can yield helpful clues about whether this is justified under the police power or the 
Public Use Clause.145 This forces the conclusion that the Hawaii legislature’s sole motivation for 
the use of eminent domain was to effect the transfer of individual parcels of land from property 
owner A to lessee B for no other reason than that it believed that society would be better off if B 
owned the land than A.  This, on its face appears to contradict Justice O’Conner’s own statement 
that "one person's property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a 
justifying public purpose, even though compensation be paid."146 
To be fair, the transfers in Midkiff did not simply transfer property from A to B, but from 
large groups of As to large groups of Bs. Thus, these private takings became public through their 
volume, if not their character.  Additionally, there was a public purpose present in Midkiff. The 
thorny problem, however, is that the transfer was the purpose as well as the mechanism. This 
begs the question of whether the fact of redistribution can justify its exercise when there are 
economic benefits to the state. The fact that the Midkiff Court did not answer this question 
directly is unsettling. More unsettling, however, is the fact that engaging in a public use analysis 
did not force the court to confront this issue.  
In discussing the Court’s engines of liberalization as applied in Berman supra, this article 
suggested that a traditional step in the takings analysis involved the Court making a decision 
regarding whether to use the stretching or the shrinking engine. This article further noted that the 
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choice necessarily was arbitrary and ultimately would have little impact on the outcome of the 
case.147 However, this does not suggest that the Court explicitly must choose between the 
stretching or shrinking engines. Even under the logic of the supposedly coherent 19th Century 
takings cases, all three engines may be used in tandem. 
As early as Miln, the Supreme Court stated that the state police power encompassed the  
State’s power to “advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for 
its general welfare, by any and every act of legislation, which it may deem to be conducive to 
these ends.”148 Once this power merged with takings analysis post-incorporation, the police 
power extended all the way to the right of the state power spectrum. Because the public use 
“restraint” simultaneously had been expanded leftward towards non-public use benefits, a large 
area of overlap between the two powers developed.149 This is was precisely the confrontation 
that the court faced in Mugler and is depicted in Figure 2, supra. However, this overlap only 
represented a confrontation because an exercise of the police power did not require 
compensation whereas an exercise of eminent domain for a pubic use did.150 Even the 
defendants in Mugler conceded the state’s right to appropriate their property; they simply 
demanded compensation.151 This compensation question was the only reason that the Court 
needed to decide between the stretching and shrinking engines.  
 By the late 20th Century, however, the question of compensation had largely dropped out 
of takings inquiry. Once the Supreme Court addressed the unfairness of allowing wholesale 
 
147 This is especially true because the principle of regulatory takings often dictates that even the 
compensation question will have the same answer under a police power or public use rubric. 
148 See note 70 Supra. 
149 See Sections 4 and 5 supra for a discussion of this phenomenon.  
150 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK AND DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY, 524-26 (3rd ed. 
2000) 
151 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 624. 
49 
deprivations of property to go uncompensated simply because it was premised on the police 
“power” by requiring compensation when the regulation went “too far,” use of the police power 
no longer precluded compensation. In fact, in cases where the government action completely 
deprived the landowner of his or her land’s value, compensation was customary.152 This 
simplified the analysis by mooting the arbitrary question of whether a taking would be called an 
exercise of the police power or a public use. Under one outcome, the government must provide 
compensation and, under the other, the government probably also must compensate. 
 An extended discussion of the regulatory takings doctrine is beyond the scope of this 
article. However, two comments on its premise and consequences do bear on the takings analysis 
of Miln. First, the idea that compensation could be required where the “taking” was not for a 
public use, or where the government’s action operated to diminish the value of, rather than seize, 
the land, represents a theoretically unjustified—if equitable—expansion of the Public Use 
Clause.  
The public use and compensation requirements are contained in the same clause of the 5th 
Amendment and are part of the same broad restriction on government takings. If the Public Use 
Clause is interpreted to have narrow boundaries, there is no logical mandate for decoupling the 
compensation requirement and extending its boundaries. The constitutional injunction “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation,”153 does not indicate that 
“compensation” is any more important than “public use;” the two requirements stand on equal 
footing. Thus, basing a rule of compensation on whether the state asserts its police power—as 
 
152 STOEBUCK AND WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY §9.4, p 533-34 (noting that the diminution 
in value must be “near complete” to warrant a finding that a taking has occurred). 
153 U.S. CONST. Amend. V. 
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opposed to a condemnation for public use—to a degree that infringes on a property’s value is an 
inherently misguided constitutional disjunction. 
Despite the theoretical problems associated with compensating landowners when the 
Supreme Court decides that shrinking, rather than stretching, is the appropriate engine for 
upholding a government action, there is a great deal of equity in awarding compensation. As 
previously stated, the decision whether to shrink or to stretch is arbitrary and without practical 
consequence. Thus, imposing a narrow application of the compensation requirement in the name 
of logical coherence when no such sacrifice is demanded of public use is palpably unfair. Put 
bluntly, if the court must mangle taking jurisprudence, the mangling at least should be 
evenhanded.  Viewed in this light, an incoherent an incoherent public use analysis mandates an 
incoherent “regulatory takings” doctrine. 
The logic of regulatory takings bears direct relevance to the Midkiff decision. Justice 
O’Conner’s controversial assertion that the “[t]he ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous 
with the scope of a sovereign's police powers,”154 is as theoretically unsound as it is an 
unfortunately accurate description of the court’s jurisprudence. Since the end of the 19th Century, 
any taking could be upheld either through stretching the Public Use Clause or shrinking it to 
accommodate a police power. However, once the monetary implications of this decision are 
removed, there is no need to choose an engine.  Either one works equally well and, with the 
assistance of the punting engine, the choice can be given to the legislature. This is illustrated 
below in Figure 3. 
 Figure 3: Takings Analysis in Midkiff Compared with the Miln/Head Conception 
 
154 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240. 
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Panel A represents the state of takings law after Miln & Head. It is identical to the 
diagram appearing in Figure 2 supra. Panel B represents the conception of takings law that 
existed after Berman and Midkiff. Under the Miln/Head model, the state’s police power had 
already swallowed Public Use completely because anything that was in a state’s power was 
unhelpfully labeled “police power.” The public use line of jurisprudence had liberalized to a 
significant extent by this point. However, as much as “public use” had become “public benefit,” 
neither Miln nor Mugler extended this into the arena of “harm prevention.”   
This article argued that, prior to Incorporation, the Public Use Clause contained an 
implicit logical tension. Because federal powers were, and still are, not plenary, reading the 
Public Use Clause as an affirmative grant of power enabled it to condemn land for purposes not 
clearly in furtherance of an enumerated power. Broadening public use thus allowed the 
State Power Continuum 
Preventing 
Recognized 
Nuisances 
Takings for 
Clear 
Public Uses 
Preventing a Public Harm Creating a Public Benefit 
Exclusive Police Power 
No Compensation Required 
Public Use & Police Power Overlap 
Compensation May Be Required 
Takings Law after Berman & Midkiff
Takings Law after Miln & Head
No Compensation Required                      Compensation May Be Required
Comp                                   Compensation May Be Required                                     Comp.  
Not Req.                                                                                                                         Req. 
Panel A
Panel B
52 
government to engage in takings that it otherwise could not. This provided an incentive for the 
Federal Government to urge a broad interpretation of this clause. The more broadly public use 
was construed, the more the government could do if it paid compensation. Though the 
compensation requirement would deter a governmental from labeling its taking as a public use, 
this price at least buys additional power. 
 Because the Supreme Court had articulated broad police powers for states, the natural 
temptation of the state would be to label an action an exercise of the police power whenever 
possible and avoid the requirement of compensation. This is most apparent in Mugler, where the 
State of Kansas urged the U.S. Court to find that “the taking must be justified on some other 
grounds than eminent domain.”155 No state would want to pay to exercise power that it could use 
for free.  To the extent that the Mugler Court was sympathetic to Kansas’ prohibition goal, it is 
understandable that the Court would employ shrinking instead of stretching. Based on these 
considerations, this article speculates that few state’s attorneys assigned to takings cases would 
advocate for a construction of Public Use that superimposed a compensation requirement upon 
pre-existing power.   
Panel B of Figure 3 graphically represents Justice O’Conner’s statement that “[t]he 
‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.”156 It 
is absurd to think that a government restraint could cover the same area as a grant of power, at 
least in theory. The definition of a restraint entails the containment, not the broadening of power. 
However, as absurd as this statement may be from a theoretical perspective, post-Mugler, a state 
could accomplish anything permissible under the Public Use Clause by using the shrinking 
engine to invoke the police power instead. However, this does not mean that the two ‘powers’ 
 
155 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 625-26. 
156 See note 74 supra. 
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were coterminous. No recorded case exists from the 19th Century in which a state asked the court 
to find a compensable taking where authority under the police power was clear.157 Thus, while it 
is fair to say that the police power, post-Mugler, extended all the way to the left of the power 
continuum, the Public Use Clause probably did not extend nearly as far leftward. 
The language of Berman marked a slight departure from earlier takings theory even 
though it achieved the same practical results. In Berman, the Court found a public use, 
apparently because it agreed with the state’s contention that the action was justified under the 
state’s police power.158 As explained supra, this seemingly oxymoronic holding had no practical 
effect on takings law because compensation had become possible at every point of the state 
power continuum when government action went “too far” in diminishing the interest of the 
landowner.159 Though the “character of the governmental action” prong of the regulatory takings 
test probably meant that the likelihood of a compensation award increased significantly toward 
the right end of the continuum160 and decreased as the action approached the left, the 
disappearance of a bright line practical distinction in the outcomes achieved by stretching or 
shrinking, eliminated the need to state which of the first two engines the courts had employed 
before punting.  Because the practical differences between application of the police power or that 
Public Use Clause to any given case had so greatly eroded, Justice O’Conner’s statement that the 
public use requirement is coterminous with the state’s police power becomes true for all practical 
purposes. 
 
157 Such as a case where the state was abating a common law nuisance. 
158 Berman, 348 U.S. at 27. 
159 See the discussion of Berman at the beginning of Section 5. 
160 This being the area where state actions most clearly resemble physical takings for actual 
public uses. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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Based on these observations, Midkiff does not represent any more of a departure from 
well-establish takings law than did Berman. The practical consequences for compensation that 
stretching or shrinking entailed at the time of Mugler, were largely erased by the late 20th 
Century due to the emergence of the regulatory takings doctrine.  This, however, simply meant 
that the Court no longer needed to make an arbitrary choice in applying takings analysis and the 
landowner no longer would be deprived of compensation based on the Court’s choice.  Takings 
jurisprudence may have been just as convoluted after Midkiff as it was after Mugler. However, 
to the extent that the Midkiff Court’s analysis was not more arbitrary or unviable than Mugler’s, 
and to the extent that a property owner could obtain compensation in more situations in 1984 
than he or she could in 1886, there is no basis for concluding that takings analysis had 
“deteriorated” in any new or meaningful way between Mugler and Kelo. The only new 
developments were an increased level of candor regarding the state of takings analysis and a 
greater possibility that a government action could require compensating the landowner.  
iii. Kelo 
 This article began with the propositions that Kelo did not diminish the rights of private 
property owners or further erode the coherence of takings jurisprudence in any novel or 
meaningful way.  Previous sections demonstrated how the pre-Incorporation era Supreme Court 
interpreted police power and public use broadly and without reference to each other, resulting in 
an unviable post-Incorporation takings rubric.   The analytical takings framework of the late 19th 
Century remained largely in place through the course of the 20th Century and, to the extent that 
any theoretical deterioration had occurred, it had not further diminished property rights. The only 
remaining question regarding the Supreme Court’s historical application of the public use/police 
55 
power analysis is whether Kelo increased the incoherence of takings analysis in any way that the 
preceding century of case law had not.  
 In Kelo, the City of New London created a corporation called the New London 
Development Corporation (NLDC) for the purposes of implementing the city’s plans to revitalize 
its severely slumping economy.161 As part of this effort, the NLDC developed a plan to condemn 
multiple tracts of private residential property bordering a local park for the purpose of tearing 
down the existing homes and building an upscale “urban village” containing office space, 
restaurants, stores and new homes.162 This development was expressly intended to capitalize on 
the Pfizer Pharmaceuticals Company’s decision to build a large facility on adjacent land.163 To 
this end, the “urban village” was designed to provide attractive spending opportunities to the 
large influx of Pfizer employees and, thereby, generate needed revenue for the City.164 
Several homeowners whose land was condemned for the proposed development 
complained that the takings were not for a public use because their homes were not blighted and 
also because the condemnations were expressly intended to benefit the employees of a single 
private corporation.165 
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the takings after noting that the “disposition of this 
case…turns on the question whether the City's development plan serves a public purpose” and 
that the category of public purposes is “broad and inclusive.”166 Writing for the majority, 
Justice John Paul Stevens stated that  
 
161 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. 2659. 
162 Id. at 2660-2661. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 2663. 
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Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long been accepted 
that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to 
another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is 
equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future 
"use by the public" is the purpose of the taking.167 
Justice Stevens then noted that The Supreme Court “long ago rejected any literal requirement 
that condemned property be put into use for the general public” 168 and that “promoting 
economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of government.”169 After 
articulating these propositions, Stevens then quoted Berman and Midkiff’s holdings that the 
government’s judgments regarding both the public interest and the means of attaining that 
interest were entitled to great deference.170 
Before disposing of the case, Stevens specifically addressed Kelo’s two arguments that 
the stated purpose of providing an attractive community for Pfizer employees violated the Public 
Use Clause and that there should be a per se rule against takings for the sole purpose of  
“economic development.”   To counter the first argument, Stevens observed  
the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private parties. 
For example, in Midkiff, the forced transfer of property conferred a direct and significant 
benefit on those lessees who were previously unable to purchase their homes.171 
In response to the second argument, Stevens opined that there was no “principled way of 
distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes that we have 
recognized.”172 Based on these rationales, Stevens found such takings to be valid public uses. 
 At first blush, the Kelo opinion appears rather unexceptional. The Court employed the 
stretching engine to include economic development with the ambit of the Public Use Clause and 
 
167 Id. at 2661.  
168 Id. at 2662. 
169 Id. at 2665. 
170 Id at 2667. 
171 Id. at 2666. 
172 Id. 
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then the punting engine to avoid determining whether the use truly was public or reasonably 
suited to achieve its purpose. None of this is particularly new and none of Steven’s remarks 
contain any novel attack on a landowner’s rights in private property. In fact, the Court’s 
emphasis on the fact that condemnation plan was “comprehensive” and preceded by “thorough 
deliberation” could be read to suggest that the Kelo Court demanded more from the government 
before it would uphold a taking than did the Berman and Midkiff Courts.173 
The fact that Kelo employed the same engines of liberalization in much the same way 
that they have always been used raises the question of why the dissent so vigorously opposed 
what, essentially was ‘more of the same.’ This question is all the more perplexing considering 
that Justice O’Conner wrote both a lengthy dissent in Kelo and the majority opinion in Midkiff.
In her Kelo dissent, O’Conner argued that the “Government may compel an individual to 
forfeit her property for the public's use, but not for the benefit of another private person.”174 
However, she previously had found in Midkiff that the systematic transfer of land from wealthy 
landowners to their poor tenants was an acceptable public use even though no one except the 
tenants who previously lived on the land would use it afterwards.175 In justifying the earlier 
Midkiff takings, O’Conner noted that the concentration of land “skewed the fee simple 
market.”176 The proposed solution entailed granting the direct benefit of land ownership to the 
 
173 Id. at 2665. The condemnation plans both in Berman and Midkiff were every bit as systematic 
as that employed by the City of New London in Kelo. Significantly, however, the Midkiff Court 
did not use this fact to support its decision. The Berman Court did mention the systematic nature 
of the program, but only in the context of holding that one property owner’s different 
circumstances did not justify departure from a general plan. Thus, neither of these cases 
emphasize the fact that property owners were afforded some measure of process, as Kelo does. 
This new emphasis could be read to suggest that the Supreme Court might require an increased 
level of Due Process protection for landowners who face condemnation.  
174 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2672 (O’Conner, J., dissenting) 
175 See generally Midkiff, note 115 supra.
176 See note 135 supra.
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individual tenants in the hope that, if done on a large scale, this would normalize the market.177 
The public good achieved through these measures can only be described as indirect.  This simply 
does not accord with O’Conner’s objection in Kelo that “if predicted (or even guaranteed) 
positive side-effects are enough to render transfer from one private party to another, then the 
words ‘for public use’ do not realistically exclude any takings…”.178 O’Conner, of course, is 
right that the words “for public use” are a rather meaningless restraint. However, she was the 
same justice who opined that the “public use requirement is…coterminous with the scope of a 
sovereign's police powers.”179 Why the change of heart? 
O’Conner attempts to distinguish Midkiff by stating that “[in Midkiff], the relevant 
legislative body had found that eliminating the existing property use was necessary to remedy the 
harm.”180 However, O’Conner’s statement of the facts is simply wrong. In Midkiff, the problem 
at issue had nothing to do with how the land was used; the problems inured solely in the fact of 
ownership. There was no expectation that the former lessees would use their land in any new 
way that would increase tax revenue or that their land would itself be available to the public. 
Indeed, Hawaii’s proposed solution, if it worked perfectly, would have resulted in the same 
people using the land in exactly the same way as they had before.181 O’Conner’s claim that the 
public benefit in Kelo—where the city at least proposes lucrative new uses for the land—is any 
more of an indirect benefit than that in Midkiff, thus, is laughable.  
 That O’Conner is wrong in her belief that Kelo can be legally distinguished from Midkiff
does not diminish the fact that there is something about the latter case that bothered her, which 
 
177 See generally Midkiff, 467 U.S. 240 
178 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2676 (O’Conner, J., dissenting) 
179 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.  
180 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2674 (O’Conner, J., dissenting) 
181 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241-42.  
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was absent in the former.182 If the indirectness of the benefit is not the cause, perhaps it is the 
fact that a single corporation stands to gain from the transaction in Kelo, whereas in Midkiff,
thousands of individual tenants would gain. It also is possible that O’Conner simply thought that 
correcting the evils of “oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth”183 was a more compelling 
governmental objective than combating a severely slumping local economy. However, if the 
direct beneficiary is only the mechanism for effectuating the ultimate public use, then the fact 
that there is one mechanism or ten thousand should not be relevant to the question of whether the 
ultimate benefit is public. Similarly, if the Supreme Court punts the identification of both the 
public purpose and the means to best effectuate that to the legislature, it would make little sense 
for the Court to then weigh the importance of one identified public purpose with another. The 
fact that O’Conner’s is unable to clearly articulate her objections to Kelo using the public 
use/police power rubric demonstrates the incoherence of the Supreme Court’s takings analysis 
with as much force as the Kelo holding itself.  
 
Section 6- “Smaller Pegs and Holes:” The Practicality and Coherence of Conservative 
Approaches to Takings Jurisprudence
As previously demonstrated, principled takings analysis cannot proceed unless a court 
first makes an arbitrary, and often meaningless, decision regarding where to draw the line 
between public use and the police power. The incoherent and arbitrary nature of this analysis 
breeds judicial frustration and encourages increased use of the punting engine.  
The fact that labeling a taking as an exercise of the police power or a public use is no 
longer determinative of the compensation issue—and has long been irrelevant to the 
 
182 It is possible that this is explained by O’Conner’s views having changed in the 20 years 
between Midkiff and Kelo, but such a proposition could only be speculative.  
183 Id. at 2674 (O’Conner, J., dissenting) 
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government’s ability to appropriate—may explain why the punting engine has become the most 
visible of the three engines of liberalization in the 20th Century cases.  In fact, neither the Kelo
majority nor concurring opinions mentions the words “police power” even once!184 However, as 
exasperating as critics may find the Supreme Court’s reflexive deference to legislative 
determinations, the punting engine does not frustrate judicial review; it merely saves courts from 
confronting the impossibility of such review.  
The forgoing analysis forcefully suggests that the Supreme Court’s takings rubric had 
become unworkable under it own terms. However, this leaves open the question of whether this 
rubric is unviable on all terms or whether clarity can be restored by narrowing the concepts of 
the police power and Public Use Clause to more conservative and literalist meanings. The 
answer to this question requires examination of the arguments of two of the most prominent 
conservative critics of the prevailing rubric, Justice Thomas and Professor Epstein.  
i.-The High Price of Coherence: The Literalist Approach of Justice Clarence Thomas 
In his Kelo dissent, Justice Thomas argues that it is “imperative that the Court maintain 
absolute fidelity to “the [Public Use] Clause.”185 According to Thomas, such fidelity requires 
that the clause be read literally to prohibit the government from taking property except “for 
public use.”186 
Thomas’ approach is very alluring for several reasons. First, the fact that the Public Use 
Clause would simply duplicate the Necessary and Proper Clause if the term “public use” did not 
have a fixed and narrow meaning militates in favor of interpreting the clause fairly literally to 
 
184 See generally Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2655-2671. The first time that the police power is mentioned 
is in Justice O’Conner’s dissenting opinion. Id. at 2675 (O’Conner, J., Dissenting). 
185 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2655-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
186 Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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give it an independent effect under established cannons of construction.187 Second, Thomas 
persuasively argues that “the phrase ‘public use’ contrasts with the very different phrase ‘general 
welfare’ used elsewhere in the Constitution.”188 This demonstrates that the framers of the Bill of 
Rights knew how to suggest a broader meaning and chose not to do so in the Public Use Clause. 
Interpreting public use literally is the only method of giving effect to this textual distinction.  
A third advantage of the literalist approach is its ease of application. Though there is 
some room for ambiguity on issues such as what percentage of the public must have access and 
whether a charge may be imposed,189 determining whether the condemnation is for an actual 
public use usually should be as straightforward as deciding whether the construction plans call 
for a public road or a private mansion.  
 Fourth and most importantly, the literalist approach appears, at least on its face, to offer 
the promise of greater protections for private property owners against government takings 
because the reasons for a taking are so limited. 
 The apparent theoretical simplicity and practical advantages of a literalist interpretation 
are strong incentives, especially given the present incoherence of the broader takings analysis. 
However, the initial appeal of this approach disguises numerous fatal flaws.   
 Restricting government takings to those situations where a public use can be 
demonstrated necessarily mandates that that, where the government cannot prove such a direct 
public use, no taking will be allowed. However, even the earliest Supreme Court cases 
demonstrate that there are many situations in which the government would have a need to 
 
187 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
188 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting); See also Nathan Alexander Sales, Classical 
Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment's "Public Use" Requirement, 49 Duke L.J. 339, 368 
(2000).  
189 See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 162-66. 
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employ eminent domain for non-public uses that most people would acknowledge as reasonable 
and necessary.  One such example appears in the Beasley opinion discussed in section 1 supra.
There the Supreme Court noted that “It would be a poor consolation to the people of this town to 
give them the power of going in and out of the town upon a railroad, while they were refused the 
means of grinding their wheat.”190 Unless the government is willing to forgo using the power of 
eminent domain to develop needed agricultural or industrial services where these operations are 
run by private businesses or not necessarily open for general public use,191 strict adherence to a 
“use by the public” test exalts form over function. 
Mills and other service providers are borderline examples because they could fall within 
the “common carrier” rubric of public use.192 However, an even clearer example can be found in 
government condemnations of land for military bases. Few people would argue that a 
government should not take necessary steps to defend its citizens. Viewed from a layman’s 
perspective, the government’s power—if not its duty—to use the eminent domain powers for 
such purposes appears beyond obvious. However, applying the literalist interpretation of public 
use would invalidate such a taking unless these bases compromised their security by allowing 
general public use and access. 
 Justice Thomas attempts to circumvent the ramifications of a strict public use test even as 
he advocates its adoption. In analyzing the Supreme Court’s adoption of a public purpose test in 
 
190 See supra note 24.
191 Not every such mill may allow members of the general public to use the facilities themselves. 
However, where the citizens of a town depend upon the finished product in their daily lives, 
there is good reason to deprive the local government of eminent domain powers because they 
have contracted with private business to operate the facility. This is much like the logic used for 
common carriers, which often may push the logic of public “use” despite the fact that they serve 
a compelling public need. 
192 See generally, Common Carriers, MARYLAND CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 4TH 
EDITION, (The Maryland Institute for Continuing Professional Education of Lawyers, Inc., 2004). 
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Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley,193 Thomas goes to great lengths to find an actual public use 
to justify the construction of an irrigation ditch. Thomas eventually concludes that a public use 
was present because a statute provided that citizens who “owned land irrigated by the ditch had a 
right to use it.”194 Thomas’s logic here is flimsy because, in his own words, only those 
landowners adjacent to the ditch had the right to use it. This does not allow use by the general 
public unless “general public” is defined to include only those people who own land that happens 
to be adjacent to the ditch. If a ditch is constructed in an area with large farms, this “general 
public” may include only six or seven landowners. 
 Thomas makes a second, even more suspect, effort to soften the rigidity of his literalist 
approach by stating that lands “owned by the government” are “public uses” ipso facto.195 
Concededly, this assertion finds support in Supreme Court precedent.196 Nonetheless it is 
logically unsupportable. A strict public use test allows courts to ascertain the beneficiaries of the 
exercise of eminent domain by examining whether the public actually uses the land. Inquiry into 
who holds title to the land is relevant only to the extent that it is probative of the ultimate issue of 
use. Actual use must remain the touchstone of a literalist public use test for one very practical 
reason. Namely, if government retention of title to the land conclusively determined the question 
of public use, then the Public Use Clause could be circumvented by a local government retaining 
title to the land, while granting the benefits of its use to a private party.  This possibility may 
appear laughable at first glance, however, the fact that the Public Use Clause was a restriction on
the ability of government to appropriate land, suggests that the possibility of government misuse 
of the power was of great concern to the framers of the Bill of Rights. 
 
193 164 US 112 (1896). 
194 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2863 (Thomas, J. Dissenting). 
195 Id. at 2684 (Thomas, J. Dissenting). 
196 See e.g. United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 US 668 (1896) 
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 Without employing artifices such as a “public ownership” exception, a court is left with 
only two possibilities in all situations where the government desires to acquire land for a public 
need beyond actual use. The first option is to preclude the government from acquiring the land, 
and force it to navigate such market forces as hold-outs and other opportunistic property owners. 
This would make the provision of many needed public benefits so expensive that the government 
often would not be able to provide them to citizens. Because this approach has such great 
potential to cripple many government efforts or force them to impose higher taxes on citizens, 
courts are unlikely to adopt this approach.  
 The second option that courts have is to allow the government to acquire the land through 
some other power. Given the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of the police power over 
the past one and a half centuries and the practical needs of society, it is overwhelmingly likely 
that the Supreme Court would adopt this approach. Because the requirements of the Public Use 
Clause could not be applied in such situations, courts would have no logical basis for mandating 
government compensation of landowners when a regulation or other government action that is 
not a public use “goes too far” and destroys the value of property. This would leave property 
owners with even less protection than they enjoy under the current system of jurisprudence. 
 These observations demonstrate that even those critics who advocate a strict public use 
requirement demand more from the takings analysis then its terms defensibly can provide. 
Unless conservatives were willing to allow numerous exceptions to the strict public use test, such 
a conception of Public Use Clause is overwhelmingly likely to hurt the interests of both society 
and individual landowners. To the extent that these exceptions are allowed, however, the 
literalist approach loses much of its initial attractiveness.  
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ii.-“Square Pegs, Round Holes, and a Few Rolls of Duct Tape:” Reading Coherence Back 
into Takings Jurisprudence through Epstein’s Theories. 
 
Professor Epstein comprehensively examines the Public Use Clause and police power 
through the lens of John Locke’s theories on the relationship between individuals, private 
property and the state in his book, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 
(“Takings”).197 It is beyond the scope of this article to critique Epstein’s use of Lockean Theory 
or to provide a general exegesis of his work on the broad subject of eminent domain 
jurisprudence. Instead, this section focuses on his interpretations of public use and the police 
power to determine whether his formulations of these concepts offer a better alternative to those 
developed by the U.S. Supreme Court.  
A. The Police Power, Crime, and Anti-Nuisance 
Epstein argues that “any adequate accounts of the ends served by the police power 
limitation should be congruent with the language and aims of the takings clause” 198.and that 
neither the Lochner Court’s articulation of the police power as containing “those powers…that 
relate to the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public”199 nor the modern view of 
the police power as all state power are conceptually viable.200 Specifically, Epstein states that  
Both the traditional and modern formulations go beyond the Lockean conception and are 
too broad to be defended in analytical terms. The legitimate state interest test in vogue 
today is a bare conclusion, tantamount to asserting that the action is legitimate because it 
is lawful.201 
197 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
(1985). 
198 Id. at 108. 
199 See note 48 supra. 
200 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS at 109 
201 Id. at 109. 
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This assertion is consistent with the analyses of the Supreme Court’s application of the police 
power in the preceding sections of this article. Epstein also is correct to observe that the 
incoherence of the police power is “the entering wedge to allow, encourage, and indeed justify 
judges to reach whatever result they prefer on any given state of affairs.”202 The Supreme Court’s 
ability to set the boundaries of the police power at different points in individual cases is very 
much related to the shrinking engine postulated by this article. However, the shrinking engine 
does not allow judges to reach “whatever result they prefer,” as Epstein claims.  
 Because the Supreme Court has refused to find a gap between the police power and the 
Public Use Clause on the state power continuum, shrinking can only function as an engine of 
liberalization, allowing the state to exercise more—never less—power.  A narrow reading of the 
police power necessarily results in an expansive reading of the Public Use Clause.  Thus, judges 
can justify “whatever result they prefer” only so long as they prefer to find the taking valid.203 
Epstein follows his criticisms of the modern Supreme Court’s interpretation of the police 
power by articulating a narrower variant of this principle. 
The relationship between public use and the police power is well captured in an analogy 
drawn from private law—the distinction between self-defense and private necessity. Self 
defense allows one to inflict harm without compensating the person harmed, while 
private necessity creates only a conditional privilege, which allows the harm to be 
inflicted but only upon payment….The police power gives the state control over the full 
catalogue of common law wrongs…including force and misrepresentation, deliberate or 
accidental, against other persons, including private nuisances.204 
This conceptualization of the police power has several attractive features. First, the analogy to 
private law fits well within Lockean Theory’s position that a government obtains the rights those 
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individuals formerly possesses in a state of nature.205 Consonance with a particular philosopher’s 
social theory, of course, is not the touchstone of its constitutionality. Nonetheless, the fact that 
Epstein’s police power can be explained according to any theory is an advantage over the 
Supreme Court’s present jurisprudence. Second, the boundaries of Epstein’s police power are far 
easier to define and apply in practice. Where the government prevents wrongful conduct, it need 
not compensate. Where the conduct is not wrongful, compensation must be paid. A third 
advantage is that Epstein’s police power comports with a very basic sense of equity. A property 
owner does not have a right to commit wrongful acts. Thus, disrupting those acts should not 
require compensation. In contrast, a property owner does have a right to engage in lawful acts 
and, thus, loses something when those acts are stopped.  However, these attractive features of 
Epstein’s police power disguise conceptual and practical deficiencies.  
 The first problem with Epstein’s police power is the difficulty of defining a “wrong.” As 
Epstein defines the term, it encompasses crimes and torts involving “force or fraud” as well as 
common law nuisances.206 In the first instance, the question of what constitutes a “nuisance” is 
not altogether clear.  Epstein comments on this problem by reference to the difficult case of 
Miller v. Shoene, which stands at the periphery of nuisance law.207 After stating his position on 
the case in qualified language, Epstein notes that  
 
205 Including the natural right of self defense and the right to preserve oneself through otherwise 
illegal means when it is necessary to prevent death or grave injury.  An additional power in this 
group is the right to exact punishment when other commit wrongs. The idea is that, when people 
leave the state of nature and enter into society, they delegate loses much of their natural right to 
harm another who has previously committed a wrong against them. This becomes the job of the 
police. Because of this logic, Epstein’s conception of the police power has great intellectual 
appeal and this article’s later articulation of a police power builds on Epstein’s logic.  
206 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS at 112. 
207 276 U.S. 272 (1928). In Miller, a fungus that lived on the cedar trees of one person’s land was 
destroying the apple trees on neighboring land. This fungus could not harm people, animals or 
most other types of trees. However, apple trees were an important local crop and the value of the 
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the intellectual difficulty of these narrow points conceals their institutional importance. 
Some uncertainty must be tolerated at the edges’ sound social institutions will never 
stand or fall on the marginal classification issues that test every legal doctrine.208 
A coherent takings analysis need not account for every possible set of facts that can develop in 
society. However, it must be able to account for the most common scenarios.  Miller falls within 
the not-uncommon category of situations where one person’s use of land harms others but is not 
wrongful in and of itself. If there is “uncertainty at the edges” of nuisance law then this may not 
be the best place to draw a bright line between the police power and takings for public use.  
 Epstein’s unexplained inclusion of crimes involving “force or fraud” within the police 
power exacerbates the uncertainty of his police power. No answer is given to the question, 
“What wrongs involve force or fraud and how does one use their property to commit them?” 
Assuming that a list of crimes and torts involving force or fraud can be developed, the next 
question is “Can this list change over time?” The question is important because if Epstein desires 
to freeze the list of wrongs that can trigger a police power response in time, then this area of law 
no longer will be able to change in response to new situations. However, if Epstein’s police 
power allows the law to change—as it must—then there must be a system for determining what 
new crimes or wrongs would be included. Such a system invites at least as much legislative 
mischief and ad hoc review as it avoids.209 To the extent that the police power has narrow 
 
apple trees was much greater than the cedars. Based on these facts, the Supreme Court upheld the 
state’s destruction of the cedars without compensation.  Epstein argues that there was nothing 
wrongful about owning the cedars and the fact that the apple trees were worth more should not 
defeat the cedar owner’s property rights.  
208 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS at 114. 
209 Legislatures easily could craft statutes that define non-compliance with a particular zoning 
ordinance as deceit or require property owners to make representations that their land is 
compliant. Even where this is not done, courts still would be forced to decide which new 
“wrongs” are nuisances without the assistance of a clear limiting principle. 
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boundaries on the other side of which lies the compensation requirement, these boundaries must 
not be “uncertain.” 
 A second problem with Epstein’s formulation of the police power is its 
underinclusiveness. Epstein’s limitation of the police power’s bounds to nuisances, force and 
fraud leaves many important areas unaddressed. The most obvious of these are crimes that do not 
involve force or fraud. It is doubtful that Epstein seriously advocates that the state compensate 
landowners before closing down brothels, as the Mugler Court chided.210 However, operating a 
brothel, though criminal in most jurisdictions, does not involve force or fraud. Epstein’ strict 
“physical invasion” test requires the harm from one landowner’s property to cross the property 
line—such as when smoke, pollutions or noxious odors invade neighbors’ properties—before the 
harm can be declared a nuisance.211 Does a quietly-operated brothel meet this test?  If not, would 
the average person deem it any less a nuisance if it was located next to his or her home?  
 The underinclusiveness of Epstein’s police power has implications beyond the exclusion 
of crime. Epstein further finds the police power inapplicable to legislation for the purposes of 
rent control,212 wetlands protection,213 flood control,214 and regulation of strip mining215 unless 
some “wrong” is committed.  If the government desires to legislate on these subjects, Epstein’s 
analysis would require compensation for all property owners who lost value as a result.216 This 
certainly provides a high degree of protection for private property owners. However, the facility 
with which the borders of the police power can be crossed means that many types of legislation 
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would become fantastically costly. Thus, as attractive as Epstein’s police power may appear to 
defenders of private property, it raises serious questions as to whether society would be prepared 
to pay the costs of these rights and whether courts would be willing to honor them consistently 
over time.  
B. The Public Use Clause and “Public Goods” 
Epstein links the issue of the Public Use Clause’s proper scope with a modified Lockean 
Theory. Stated very briefly, an organized society can produce wealth more efficiently than an 
equal number if individuals in a state of nature.217 The difference between the amount of wealth 
that a given number of individuals could accumulate in a state of nature and the amount of 
wealth that the same number of individuals could accumulate in society is the “surplus.”218 
Epstein’s conception of Lockean Theory demands that the government of the society return all 
surplus—minus that needed to operate the government—to the individual members of the 
society, on a pro rata basis.219 According to Epstein, one of the fundamental purposes of the 
Public Use Clause is to ensure that the government does not use its eminent domain power to 
grant disproportionate surplus to influential individuals or groups.220 
This surplus theory is outlined above because it informs Epstein’s conception of the 
Public Use Clause to such a high degree. However, this section argues that Epstein’s emphasis 
on interpreting the Public Use Clause to fit within Lockean Theory—as opposed to within the 
text of the Constitution—is a significant analytical shortcoming.  
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 Epstein asserts that there are three categories of permissible public use. The first is rooted 
in the economic theory of “public goods” and includes government services such as national 
defense.  A public good requires two elements: 1) non-exclusivity and 2) minimal costs 
associated with increasing the number of beneficiaries.221 National defense is non-exclusive 
because “the act of providing protection for one citizen also provides it for his neighbor.”222 A 
citizen cannot practically refuse the benefit of this service. Similarly, the marginal costs of 
providing this service to 100 citizens is not proportionally lower than the cost of providing it for 
10,000 citizens.223 Thus, government condemnations for the purpose of building military bases, 
lighthouses and other generalized public services satisfy the Public Use Clause under the same 
logic as national defense. 
 Epstein’s second category of public uses includes services such as parks and highways, 
which individual citizens can refuse to use. Epstein notes that these services do have 
proportionally increasing marginal costs and that they are public “only because the government 
chooses to provide them.” Nonetheless, he concludes that the eminent domain power “surely 
[can] be used to acquire land…for these purposes.”224 
Epstein’s labels the final category of valid public uses “private takings for public use.”225 
These takings encompass the controversial “indirect benefits” at issue in Berman, Midkiff, and 
Kelo where eminent domain is used to transfer property from one private citizen to another under 
the theory that the second citizen will use the property to provide a public benefit that the first 
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citizen could not.226 For a taking in this category to be valid, Epstein asserts that two conditions 
must be met. First, there must be a “bilateral monopoly born of necessity.”227 Second, some 
effort must be made to divide the surplus between the [transferring and acquiring parties].”228 
Epstein asserts that the Supreme Court’s early Mill Act Cases are explainable under the 
bilateral monopoly/surplus division framework. A bilateral monopoly exists where “there is only 
one buyer and one seller, resulting in transactional delays because each party can hold out for a 
better deal without fearing that the other party will turn [elsewhere]”229 Epstein claims that this 
situation was in play with Mill Act Cases because damming a river for the mill always would 
cause upstream land to flood.230 The owner of the mill had no ability to choose between different 
parcels of land and, if the owner(s) of the upstream parcels refused to sell their land—perhaps in 
hopes of driving up the price—then the mill could not be built.231 Because mills were essential 
to local industry, the public would benefit if the government used eminent domain. Further, 
because the mill owner was constrained by the bilateral monopoly, there is less danger that he or 
she is using the government to “assert his dominion and will over another,”232 or so Epstein’s 
argument runs.   
 After identifying the existence of a bilateral monopoly in the Mill Act Cases, Epstein 
next notes that many of the states were required to pay 150% of the property’s value before they 
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could condemn it.233 Epstein reasons that, in such a situation, the owner of the mill and the owner 
of the property to be condemned became “the public” and each obtained “a pro rata share of the 
gain to the extent that ordinary institutions can provide it.”234 Thus, Epstein reasons that the 
surplus is evenly divided among the public, satisfying his second criterion.235 
There are many grounds for contesting the application of Epstein’s bilateral 
monopoly/division of surplus theory to the Mill Act Cases on a theoretical level. However, 
because this section is concerned with the broader and more fundamental problems associated 
with Epstein’s hypothesis, it is only appropriate here to point out the two most obvious problems.  
First, “born of necessity” is a slippery concept that begs the question, “whose necessity?” 
The mill may be beneficial for the local community but this does not mean it is necessary. 
Indeed, because so few improvements are necessary for the continued survival of a community, 
public necessity would be an unreasonably restrictive requirement for takings. It also would 
place non-elected judges in the position of deciding whether a taking that the entire population 
and their elected government finds important rises to the heights of necessity.  If “born of 
necessity” means only that the mill owner must use the particular parcel of condemned land, then 
necessity is satisfied any time a person proposes a project that requires using his neighbor’s land. 
Such a safeguard on property not only is easily bypassed, it is fundamentally misdirected, 
focusing on the needs of the mill owner as opposed to the needs of society.236 
233 Id. See also note 30 supra 
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The second problem inuring in Epstein’s hypothesis is that the 150% price actually 
divides the surplus equitably between the two parties. This simply is not realistic. There is no 
method of adequately valuating the surplus wealth that the mill will generate at the time of 
condemnation. Even Epstein acknowledges that “one should not demand perfect precision 
because there is no way to provide it.”237 However, this “uncertainty at the edges” argument 
disguises two important facts: 1) there is no method of even roughly approximating the amount 
of surplus that a long-term project will bring, and 2) division of the surplus is not a fair method 
of valuating compensation—it has nothing to do with public use—because it encourages the 
owners of worthless land to hold out for condemnation whenever they think that the project will 
generate the surplus. Such heavy-handed protection of private property utterly divorces the 
compensation question from the land’s subjective or market value.  
Notwithstanding the “uncertainty at the edges” of Epstein’s categories of valid public 
uses, they are fairly good descriptions of many of the Supreme Court’s holdings. An analysis of 
Epstein’s application of the bilateral monopoly/division of surplus rubric to the Mill Act Cases 
reveals that the rubric not only fits, it is tailor-made. However, therein lies the most fundamental 
problem with Epstein’s categories of public use.  
One of the great dangers in superimposing a new theoretical framework on past cases is 
that the theory can fit the facts perfectly while utterly failing to capture the underlying forces that 
caused the case to be decided as it was. Any number of theories, from “bilateral monopolies” to a 
special exception for mills can be crafted to fit the facts. However, the fact a theory can be made 
to fit does not mean that is should be used. Ultimately, Epstein’s analysis of the Mill Act Cases is 
 
to prove this has the potential to generate prohibitively long and expensive discovery processes.  
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more concerned with Lockean Theory than it is with constitutional text or the realities of the 
case. As Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously observed in his Lochner
dissent, “[t]he 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.”238 
Even conceding that the Mill Act cases fit within the “bilateral monopoly/division of surplus” 
theory perfectly and that John Locke would approve of takings to provide “public goods,” the 
question remains “what does any of this have to do with whether a taking meets requirements of 
the Public Use Clause?  
The only answer that Epstein provides is the rather conclusory statement that his theory 
“is consistent with the general pattern of [the Founder’s] arguments and the language in which 
they expressed it.”239 With only this proof, Epstein’s statement that “the language of public use 
invites the theory of public goods”240 is more conclusion than argument.  
 
C. Duct Tape Can’t fix Everything: Assembling Epstein’s Takings Theory 
The overriding theme in Epstein’s conceptions of the police power and Public Use Clause 
is to greatly limit the situations in which the government can take property without compensation 
under the police power241 while dramatically expanding public use to require compensation for 
many types of government action previously categorized as exercises of the police power.242 
However, Epstein’s analysis accomplishes more than moving the boundary line between the 
police power and the Public Use Clause far to the left on the state power continuum. Epstein’s 
theory also decreases overall state power to condemn in certain instances by excluding them 
from both the police power and the Public Use Clause. This is illustrated in Figure 4 infra.
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Figure 4. Epstein’s Analytical Takings Framework 
 
Epstein’s police power encompasses only nuisances that physically invade neighboring land and 
crimes and torts involving force or fraud.243 Epstein’s Public Use Clause encompasses takings to 
provide public goods that citizens must use, takings where the government retains ownership of 
the land and uses it to provide a service that citizens can choose to use, and private takings where 
there is a bilateral monopoly born of necessity.  However, despite his innovative use of economic 
theory to draw the lines between these two concepts, Epstein retains the Supreme Court’s 
overarching analytical dichotomy between public use and police power.  Rather than articulating 
new categories, Epstein’s focus is on “moderating the line drawing problem” between the 
existing categories.244 Thus, Epstein’s analysis shares one essential trait—and one essential 
failing—with Thomas’s and the majority’s test in Kelo: an action must be characterized either as 
police power or public use. 
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 Despite using the same dichotomous takings model as Thomas and the Supreme Court 
majority, Epstein injects a new dimension into the debate through his careful sculpting of the 
police power and public use concepts. Specifically, he raises the possibility that a taking 
designed to effectuate some public purpose might not be allowed under either the police power 
or the Public Use Clause. In essence, those purposes fall into an analytic “void” that either 
precludes state action or simply precludes analysis depending on whether Epstein’s model is 
used as for lawmaking or analysis. These voids are depicted by the white spaces on the state 
power continuum in Figure 4.245 
Section 6(ii)a supra demonstrated that Epstein’s police power excludes many forms of 
harmful conduct and argued that a literal application of Epstein’s theory would allow brothels to 
remain in business because they do not involve force or fraud category, are not physically 
invasive nuisances, and because taking them would deprive the owner of the property rights in 
their income.246 If the police power cannot be employed here, the question becomes whether the 
state can regulate through the public use rubric. Because Epstein limits public use to three 
categories, this question must be broken down into three parts: 1) does the brothel present a 
bilateral monopoly, the necessity of which justifies regulation? 2) would closing the brothel 
result in the government using the land to provide a service? and 3) does shutting down the 
brothel result in the creation of a public good? The irrelevance of the first two categories should 
be clear without further analysis. However, the question is a little more difficult with regard to 
the third category. 
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The elimination of the brothel arguably can be categorized as furthering the public 
purpose of health or morality (the traditional domain of the police power). The next inquiry is 
whether this benefit is exclusive and whether the marginal costs of providing it increase as the 
benefit is provided to more people. At this point, the analysis breaks down. It is possible to argue 
the exclusivity and cost questions either way without proving anything more than that the 
analysis is poorly suited to answering the question. 
 This article does not seriously suggest that that a court applying Epstein’s analysis would 
allow the brothel to continue. Nor does it suggest that the court would make compensation a 
precondition of its termination. However, the fact that a strict application of Epstein’s analysis 
would lead a court down this fairytale road suggests that there is something seriously amiss with 
Epstein’s analysis. It is absurd to suggest that a judge would engage in an extensive analysis of 
the police power and the Public Use Clause to determine whether the property rights of a brothel 
owner have been violated. Certainly—read hopefully—common sense would prevail long before 
this. However, the fact that Epstein’s formulations of the police power and Public Use Clause 
dictate such an analysis make one of two results inevitable: courts either will ignore the analysis 
altogether or expand the boundaries of the police power to fill in these voids. Where the example 
is as ridiculous as a pimp demanding his property rights in court, a judge most likely would 
pursue the former. However, in a more serious case, the latter route is more likely.  
 The problem of “the void” exists on the benefit conference side of the state power 
spectrum as well. To illustrate this, it is helpful to borrow an example from the Supreme Court’s 
past cases. In Midkiff, the state of Hawaii was faced with overly concentrated land ownership 
that hurt the state’s economy.247 This example will exaggerate the problem in two ways. First, 
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the majority of the state’s land will be held by only five or ten private citizens. Second, the 
effects of this concentrated land ownership on the state’s economy will be so dire that they 
would threaten to undermine the state’s solvency. These modifications are designed to put the 
state into a position where it must act. The question then becomes whether the Epstein model 
will allow the state to act. 
 Epstein’s conception of the police power requires an invasive nuisance, force or fraud to 
operate. Unless the Hawaiian property owner acquired the property through force or fraud, the 
state will not be able to use the police power. The fact that the intangible concept of ownership 
cannot physically invade a neighbor’s land precludes the finding of a nuisance. So far, this does 
not change the outcome of Midkiff because the legislature provided compensation despite the 
use of a police power rationale.248 However, the outcome does change when the state resorts to 
Epstein’s public use rubric.  
 The Hawaii legislature’s action cannot be called a “public good” because each property 
must be targeted on an individual basis. The aggregated benefit may be public, but each instance 
of the taking is exclusive to the two parties involved.  This legislature’s action also fails the 
marginal cost test because for each new citizen covered, the state must loan up to 99% of the 
cost.249 Thus, the marginal cost of extending the benefit is directly proportional to the number of 
people covered. 
 The title transfer program cannot be justified as a government-provided service because 
the legislature does not plan to occupy the land and make it available to the general public. This 
leaves only the bilateral monopoly argument. In Midkiff, the property owners did not want to sell 
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because of the associated tax consequences and the tenants could not afford to buy.250 This 
represents a breakdown in commerce, but it is not a bilateral monopoly problem. The landowner 
would suffer the same tax consequences by selling to another tenant and the tenant’s poverty 
would preclude purchase without regard to which property he or she desired.  Second, the 
Hawaii legislature does not pay a premium to the landowner in an attempt to divide the 
surplus.251 Thus, the title transfer project flunks the bilateral monopoly test on both counts and 
the legislature is left without a justifying public use for addressing the social problem caused by 
the pattern of land holding. 
D. The Problem of Analytical Rigidity 
 The fact that Epstein’s model precludes Midkiff-style takings does not necessarily reflect 
an analytical failure. In fact, people concerned with increasing the protections for private 
property may find the model attractive for precisely this reason. Such people also would see the 
voids more as zones of protection. However, even if the theoretical problems in Epstein’s 
analysis could be removed a rule requiring the government to compensate for environmental 
protection, rent control statutes and other such benefits is deemed desirable, Epstein’s analytical 
framework still contains a fatal defect: rigidity.  
 Epstein’s model is not a practical alternative for the Supreme Court because his analytical 
framework cannot be severed from his conservative position.  The coherence of his overarching 
analytical framework is completely dependent upon acceptance of the boundaries that Epstein 
himself has set. Any attempt to depart from these causes the framework to collapse. The 
modified Midkiff example demonstrates this point simply.  
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 The discussion of the modified Midkiff example supra ended with two conclusions, the 
first of which was assumed. First, the state needed to employ the title transfer program to remain 
economically viable. Second, The Epstein tests for public benefits did not allow it to do so. This 
problem does not rise to the theoretical level so long as a court is willing to enjoin the state from 
taking the necessary action and the state is willing to abide by the court’s determination. 
However, such a situation places enormous pressures on a court to bend its analysis to 
accommodate the necessary state action. This pressure exists even where the state’s need is not 
so dire but the benefit appears public and important.  
If a judge wanted to accommodate Hawaii’s program, it would be necessary to stretch 
one of Epstein’s public uses. If the court stretched the public goods rubric, a possible rationale 
might weigh the perceived benefit against the marginal cost of extending the benefit to others 
and, concluding that the benefit was greater than the cost, would find a marginal cost of less than 
zero. Similarly, when analyzing “exclusivity,” the court could aggregate the thousands of 
individual takings to find non-exclusivity or focus the exclusivity analysis on the indirect benefit 
of an improved economy. This mode of analysis has two important implications. First, it allows 
the court to achieve what appears to be the necessary or sensible result. Second, it eviscerates the 
public goods test, leaving an empty shell of a rule that can be satisfied by any private takings that 
confers an indirect benefit on the public.  Once a court departs from Epstein’s parameters—
which over the course of decades it will repeatedly be tempted to do—no limiting principle 
remains that can be applied in the next case on the court’s docket. This rigidity also is present in 
Epstein’s other categories under both the police power and public use because each category 
demands that a taking meet stringent requirements. 
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The inflexibility of Epstein’s tests replicates the problem of the original dichotomy 
between public use and police power. Once a court abandons the idea that a taking must be for 
an actual public use, no clear limiting principle remains. “Public need” is no closer to “public 
use” than “public benefit” or “public convenience.” Thus, once a court retreats from its original 
position, no foothold exists to stop the analytical freefall.  Epstein’s analysis does more than 
simply replicate the Supreme Court’s analytical difficulties in proxy form; his analysis 
necessarily reduces back to the same flawed model.  Once Epstein’s categories of public use and 
police power are stretched beyond their original parameters to fill the voids in state power, they 
lose their distinct theoretical identities and become broad, overlapping paths to the same ultimate 
destination: the question of whether the conduct is a valid exercise of the police power or valid 
public use.  At this point, Epstein’s analytical model is no more than the same dichotomous 
police power/public use analysis, with the boundary line between these two concepts pushed far 
to the left on the state power continuum to reflect Epstein’s conservative views.  Unfortunately 
for Epstein, without an analytical limiting principle, there is nothing to stop courts from pushing 
this line back to the right through the engines of liberalization. 
The failure of Epstein’s analytical framework to present a viable alternative to the 
Supreme Court’s current model is not the product of any weakness in his theoretical innovations. 
In fact, many of his proposed categories have great analytic value. Epstein’s essential failing is 
that, while vigorously challenging the Supreme Court’s takings analysis, he passively adopts the 
same dichotomous model at the core of this analysis.  
Because there is no room for a middle ground between public use and the police power in 
either Epstein’s or the Supreme Court’s models and because the initial categorization of a 
government action is so outcome-determinative, there is an inherent pressure to extend the police 
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power to all government actions that a court believes should not require compensation and the 
Public Use Clause to all government actions that the court thinks should require compensation. 
Where this process operates, categorization is reduced to conclusion. Even categories based on 
initially well-articulated principles ultimately break down as the government actions that each 
category encompasses become less and less unified by any common characteristic outside of the 
fact that some court, at some time, thought that one government action should be compensable 
and another not. Efforts to restore coherence by rearticulating the original categories in rigid and 
conservative terms is not sufficient to stop this process where the pressure of the conclusion is 
not removed from the issue of categorization.  
It is not clear why Professor Epstein would go to the trouble of creating a comprehensive 
theory of takings just to build it atop the same shaky foundation as the theory he seeks to destroy.  
However, while it is impossible to definitively guess Epstein’s motivations, his complete failure 
to discuss the problems occasioned by Incorporation in his comprehensive book Takings and his 
attempts to ascribe reason to the later Mill Act era cases forcibly suggests that Epstein, like many 
eminent domain scholars, does not apprehend how far back into history the roots of the Supreme 
Court’s incoherent takings jurisprudence extend.  Unfortunately, Epstein’s misplaced belief in an 
idyllic era of takings jurisprudence blinds him to the inherent imprecision of the dichotomous 
takings model. By building his own analysis on this flawed model, Epstein shackles even his 
most innovative solutions to the same analytical uncertainties that they are meant to overcome.  
Section 7-“From Pegs and Holes to Practical Holdings:” Restoring Coherence to the 
Takings Debate by Altering its Terms
A. Summary and Conclusions 
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The specific conclusions of the foregoing sections force a broader and more fundamental 
conclusion: the Supreme Court’s analytical framework and the dichotomous model on which it is 
predicated are incapable of producing consistently principled and practical adjudication no 
matter how much it they are restated and refined. Rejecting this flawed rubric is a necessary 
precondition to bringing coherence to takings law.  This raises the final question that addressed 
in this article: with what can we replace this analytical framework? 
B. The Way Forward 
 The fundamental problem with the concept of public use is that it is not possible to 
stretch its rubric far enough to encompass every public appropriation that the majority of people 
would regard as necessary and legitimate without transmogrifying the term into something 
devoid of all intellectual integrity. At some point, honesty must compel courts to acknowledge 
the simple truth that no matter what labels or tests the court employs, there are only two 
categories of valid public uses: 1) those which society always regards as legitimate and 2) those 
that society sometimes regards as legitimate.  Examples of the former include takings for a direct 
public use such as building a bridge or a road and takings where the land will be used by a 
“common carrier.”252 Examples of the latter include takings for a “public benefit,” such as urban 
development or economic growth. This principle applies with equal force to the police power. 
Some exercises of the police power, such as abating recognized nuisances, are universally 
deemed valid. Other exercises of the police power, such as for rent control or environmental 
protection, are more controversial. 
 
252 The “common carrier” exception allows the government to condemn land and transfer it to 
private parties who operate services that all citizens may use on a non-discriminatory basis, often 
upon the payment of a fee. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 168. Privately-operated railways and parks are 
common exampled of this. Id. 
85 
 Acknowledging that there are two categories of police power and public use underscores 
the problem with a dichotomous analysis. However, it also suggests what contours the solution 
should take. For two questions, there should be two analyses and two answers. Conceptually 
severing the categories leads to much greater analytic precision. Therefore courts should reframe 
their takings analysis into two questions: 1) can the taking be categorized as a clear exercise of 
the police power or a clear public use? and 2) if not, then does the taking fall somewhere 
between the two categories or is it entirely private? Framing the inquiry allows a court both to 
determine where on the state power continuum a given government action falls and provides 
clues as to how the court should analyze it. This is represented graphically in Figure 5 below 
Figure 5: Reconceptualizing the Dichotomy 
 
This schema depicts two ideations of the state power continuum. Panel A represents the 
analytical uncertainty of the prevailing dichotomous model. While there are certain government 
actions that clearly fall within the ambit of the police power and public use, state actions that fall 
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within the vast area between these poles possess elements of both. No coherent principle justifies 
stretching one or both powers across the state power continuum because it forces courts into the 
zero-sum game of labeling an ambivalent state actions either as a “clear exercise of the police 
power” or a “clear public use.” Of course, where the state action is not clearly a public use or an 
exercise of the police power, calling it such only derogates from the precision of the categories, 
leading to muddled analysis. This results in categorization by conclusion problem discussed 
supra.
Panel B represents the conservative model of the police power/public use dichotomy 
from Figure 1.253 Under this model, to which Justice Thomas claims adherence, neither the 
police power nor Public Use Clause is stretched beyond their logically defensible parameters. 
Unfortunately, this analytic precision exacts a heavy price because, under a dichotomous 
framework, a state action that neither is a public use nor an exercise of the police power cannot 
be valid.254 This creates a large void under which many practical state actions fall. 
A comparison of Panels A and B points toward the solution argued for in this section: 
retain the clarity of Panel B and the practicality of Panel A by creating a third analytical category 
which embraces the zone of ambiguity. In practice, the four categories outlined above (two 
police powers and two public uses) reduce to a three-category analysis.  This is because two of 
the categories—1) possible exercises of the police power and 2) possible public uses—entirely 
overlap.  Once a court finds that the government action is intended to serve some public purpose, 
then it remains only to determine whether the action is grounded in a state power which is not 
subject to the Public Use Clause’s compensation requirement—what most scholars call 
 
253 See Section 3, page 19 supra. 
254 See Section 6a supra for a discussion of Justice Thomas’ arguments in favor of limiting the 
reach of the Public Use Clause to effectuate takings. 
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“exercises of the police power”—or whether the action is grounded in state power that is subject 
to the Clause’s compensation requirement. Thus, the categories of possible public use and 
possible exercises of the police power collapse into the broader category that Figure 5 labels the 
“zone of uncertainty.” This category is defined by the practical consideration of whether 
compensation should or should not be required for a specific government action. Its boundaries 
are the point beyond which compensation clearly and uncontroversially is required, on the right 
of the continuum, and the point beyond which compensation clearly and uncontroversially is not 
required, on the left of the continuum.  Thus, if the answer to the compensation question is not 
immediately clear from the nature of the government action, then such action falls within the 
zone of uncertainty.  
The three categories outlined above: clear public use, clear police power, and zone of 
uncertainty, are the essential building blocks of the analysis urged by this article. At this point, 
one might note that the zone of uncertainty appears more of a restatement of the problems in 
takings analysis than a solution. However, this assumes that an action falling within the zone of 
uncertainty eventually must be characterized as an act of the police power or of the takings 
clause. Notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court and most takings theorists feel 
compelled to label a taking as police power or public use, there is no logical reason to require 
this step.  As the analysis in the preceding sections has shown, once a government action falls 
within the ambit of state power, the only question with any practical consequence is whether 
 
 It is important to note the existence of a fifth category: government actions intended to 
effectuate entirely private purposes (i.e. actions designed solely to benefit or harm a single 
citizen or group of citizens). Such government actions are not within a state power and, thus, are 
not represented on the state power continuum. However, the fact that this category is not 
represented does not relieve a court from the duty to enquire whether the government action is 
public or private. This is a threshold question, and it is only proper for a court to engage in 
takings analysis after a public purpose has been found. 
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compensation should be required. Because the issue is not clear in the zone of uncertainty, there 
is no reason to apply the same bright-line rules that are appropriate in the clear police power and 
clear public use categories.  A better approach is to apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to all 
actions in this category in order to determine whether compensation is fair under the 
circumstances of the particular case.  This intermediate level of scrutiny should parallel the 
regulatory takings analysis and specifically focus on the degree to which the government action 
in question is designed to correct harm caused by the property owner—such as pollution, 
interference with the rights of other property owners, etc.—or confer a public benefit. 
The line between conferring a public benefit and preventing harm is difficult to draw and 
employing the three category framework urged in this article, concededly, cannot bring it into 
sharper focus. However, what this framework can do is mitigate the practical consequences of 
this uncertainty by abandoning the all-or-nothing compensation approach.  Many government 
actions, such as urban renewal, both abate harms caused by a landowner and confer additional 
public benefits. There is no reason to forbid a government that takes possession of blighted land 
from doing nothing more than restoring it to its non-blighted value. To the extent that the 
government can do more with the land, society benefits all the more. However, unless the public 
harm that the government seeks to abate is exactly equal to 100% of the property’s value, all 
such takings must result either in a net benefit or net loss to the government. In such situations, 
all-or-nothing-compensation is not appropriate and a more enlightened—and equitable—
approach would be to assign a monetary value to the harm and use it to offset any compensation 
due to the landowner for the taking.255 
The complete analytical framework proposed by this article appears in Figure 6. 
 
255 This article merely introduces this rule as a general concept. The task of defining its precise 
contours is appropriately left to courts to decide based on specific facts. 
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Figure 6: Proposed Multi-Tiered Framework for Takings 
 
Takings falling within the clear public use and clear police power categories retain the all-or-
nothing compensation model whereas the zone of uncertainty employs scaleable compensation. 
This multi-tiered framework possesses numerous advantages over the Supreme Court’s 
dichotomous model. However, before these advantages may be described, principled boundaries 
of these three categories should be articulated. 
Three considerations must inform the process of setting boundaries for the police power 
and Public Use Clause in the proposed multi-tiered framework. First, the boundaries must be 
practical. When judges are forced to choose between abandoning established analyses and 
achieving equitable results, they must—or at least should—choose fairness. Therefore, a takings 
framework cannot force courts to make that choice if it hopes to endure. Second, the framework 
must be flexible. As argued in preceding sections, rigid frameworks tailored to accommodate 
specific political viewpoints will be upset completely by changes in judicial attitude.256 Thus, a 
framework must be able accommodate both conservative and liberal applications without losing 
its coherence. Third and finally, the framework must be Constitutional. Where concepts derive 
 
256 This is one of the defects in Epstein’s model in section 6 (ii) supra 
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from the text of the Constitution, their boundaries must be defensible according to the 
document’s text.  
 Brief reflection on the aforementioned considerations suggests the boundaries that should 
be imposed on the three categories of the multi-tiered model. The Public Use Clause states “nor 
shall property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”257 The most obvious 
construction of this clause—or the one that involves the least stretching—is that it only applies to 
takings for an actual public use. Justice Thomas argues this point powerfully in his Kelo
dissent.258 Unfortunately, Thomas’ analysis is limited by the pressures of reaching socially-
desirable results. The proposed model removes that pressure because its structure no longer 
requires judges to label actions a clear public use in order to reach specific conclusions regarding 
the compensation or validity questions. Under the proposed model, a court retains the flexibility 
to reach a desired outcome in the zone of uncertainty. The only consequences of such a 
categorization are 1) that the court will use intermediate tier scrutiny to determine the validity of 
the government action and 2) that scaleable compensation may be paid. Because this framework 
relieves the pressure on the Public Use Clause, there is no reason not to restore the most 
textually-defensible reading of the Clause.  Therefore, the proposed model will treat only actual 
public uses as “clear public uses,” subject to rational basis review and mandatory 
compensation.259 “Public goods” and other public benefits will fall into the zone of uncertainty, 
where they will be subject to an intermediate tier of scrutiny.  
 
257 U.S. CONST. AMEND. V (emphasis supplied). 
258 See section 6(i) supra.
259 It is, of course possible to argue that common carriers involve actual public use even if a 
citizens’ physical body is not using the property. To the extent that the common carrier exception 
is non-controversial, this article would not object to including them within the category of clear 
public uses. However, because a category is always easier to broaden than to narrow, the 
decision whether to include common carrier is properly left to later scholars and courts.  
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 Defining the scope of the police power does not require the same attention to 
Constitutional interpretation as the Public Use Clause. Because the concept is a judicial creation, 
not subject to the same deference as Constitutional text, the boundaries of the police power 
should be informed primarily by analytical utility. In other words, the line should be drawn 
where it would be most analytically useful. This almost certainly should be the point on the state 
power continuum beyond which compensation indisputably is not required. Thus, this article 
largely agrees with Epstein that the police power should be limited to anti-nuisance and 
common-law crime.260 Restricting the police power in this way allows a court to use the term in a 
way that has a definitive meaning and a definitive consequence. However, because police power 
and residual sovereignty are decoupled, a court finding that an activity does not fall within the 
ambit of the police power would not automatically preclude the state from taking the action or 
require compensation.  
 The final category that requires definition is the zone of uncertainty. Now, with the 
boundaries of public use and the police power firmly in place, this zone no longer is uncertain. It 
encompasses all state power that is not police power and which does not involve an exercise of 
eminent domain for use by the public. This is the area with which the courts have struggled most. 
As a result, this is the area where heightened review will allow a court to develop a more 
complete factual record and actually wrestle with—as opposed to punt—the questions of whether 
1) the activity generates a public benefit or prevents a public harm and 2) how much 
compensation, if any, is appropriate.  With this rubric in place, the zone of uncertainty may 
broadly be renamed the state stewardship power, or further reduced to several smaller categories 
once a sufficient body of case law exists to justify principled labels. 
 
260 This model would, however, drop Epstein’s “force or fraud” requirement for the reasons 
argued in section 6(ii)a supra.
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C. Concluding Comments on the Advantages and Utility of the Multi-Tiered Model. 
 The multi-tiered model proposed in this section was developed to address the specific 
problems identified in the first six sections of this article. The proposed framework should prove 
principled, flexible and, therefore, stable. However it is not a panacea for every takings problem 
facing modern courts.  
First and foremost, the proposed model is not a prescriptive test for takings—it is only a 
framework. The use of heightened scrutiny for analyzing government actions falling within the 
zone of uncertainty, or stewardship power, is intended to improve protections for private 
property holders. However, its specific purpose is to require the government to provide a court 
with clear reasons and data—instead of bare conclusions—so that the court can detect 
government abuse. Once a court possesses these data, it still must exercise its own judgment to 
resolve the compensation and validity issue. However, under the proposed model, the court will 
be able to articulate the principles that motivated its decision within a framework clear enough to 
enable litigants and scholars to understand its meaning and to propound coherent criticisms. This 
removes the problem of circular logic such as “it is legal because it is lawful (an exercise of the 
police power)” that precludes analysis and criticism of the Supreme Court’s current model. 
The second important attribute of this model is that it balances the interests of private 
property owners and the government in a more meaningful way than a single-tiered model. 
Epstein proposes applying intermediate level scrutiny to all government takings to enhance the 
protections for property owners.261 This objective is laudable but the method is overkill.  Where 
the government can demonstrate that the taking is designed to abate a nuisance without 
conferring an additional public benefit or that that the property actually will be used by the 
 
261 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS at 181 
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public, courts should be able to weigh the merits of taking without extensive discovery or 
rigorous analysis. This is especially true of actual public uses, which can be decided by the 
government simply averring that the property will be used by the public and briefly describing 
the method of use.   
Where a case falls under the stewardship power, intermediate scrutiny provides a 
valuable safeguard. The government would be required to present evidence that its condemnation 
plan is designed to achieve a public benefit and that the taking is reasonably related to achieving 
that public benefit. The court need not place itself in the uncomfortable position of weighing the 
importance of a benefit to the public. Rather, this scrutiny would focus on determining that some 
benefit would result from the plan and the condemned property is related to the plan. Here, 
again, the framework proves flexible because courts may adjust the quantum of proof of a benefit 
that they require from the government or the degree to which the property must be related to that 
benefit.262 This enables the framework to accommodate a conservative approach—where the 
government would bear a significant burden of proof, a liberal approach—where the government 
could pass the test with minimal discovery and argument, or anything in between. 
A third attribute of this framework is that it balances the interests of private property 
owners and the public even outside of the courtroom.  Some opponents of heightened scrutiny 
argue that it will place too great a burden on the government and increase the cost of many 
socially-useful projects.263 The multi-tiered model accounts for this on two separate levels.  
First, where there is a clear public use or exercise of the police power, the government need not 
 
262 This could range from the low threshold of “reasonably related” to the high standard of 
“reasonably necessary” without harming the integrity of the analysis. 
263 John D. Echeverria, Georgetown Environmental Law and Policy Institute’s “Top Ten” 
Takings Issues. American Law Institute - American Bar Association Continuing Legal 
Education: Annual Advanced ALI-ABA Course of Study, 2004. available on Westlaw at SJ086 
ALI-ABA 297. 
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go through the time and expense of satisfying a heightened level of scrutiny. Second, even where 
heightened scrutiny is used, the burden on the government will not always be onerous.  Where 
the validity of the government’s purpose is readily discernable and the connection between the 
action and the ultimate purpose is straightforward, intermediate-tiered scrutiny should not entail 
extensive discovery or a lengthy trial.  However, the more questionable the government’s 
purpose is or the more tenuous the connection between the action and purpose are, the harder it 
will be to satisfy this burden.  Considering that an exercise of eminent domain can uproot one or 
many families, it is not unreasonable to require the government to prove that it has a practical 
and reasonably forward-thinking plan for using the properties to confer benefits.  
A corollary of this principle is that if the government has invested the requisite amount of 
thought and preparation prior to condemning the land, then intermediate level scrutiny will be 
less onerous as the government already should possess much of the evidence necessary to prove 
its case. Where the government has not been particularly diligent, the specter of intermediate-
tiered scrutiny provides a potent incentive to think twice before condemning property and 
encourages negotiation with property owners. 
The advantages of the proposed multi-tiered framework stand in stark contrast to the 
faulty dichotomous analysis employed both by the court and its critics. A rigid analytic 
framework that forces courts to choose between coherence and practicality under multiple 
ideations and over several centuries should not be tweaked, restated, circumvented or amended; 
it should be immediately and unequivocally rejected. The multi-tiered framework provides a far 
superior alternative, capable of yielding consistently principled and practical judicial 
determinations even as judicial attitudes towards takings changes.  Accordingly, this article urges 
the Supreme Court to abandon its faulty dichotomous takings analysis and adopt the multi-tiered 
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model described herein. Only by doing this, can the Court give expression to the myriad legal 
principles and normative values which define and drive takings jurisprudence. 
